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CHAPTER I
Introduction
This dissertation assesses four distinct development interventions. The first inter-
vention presented in Chapter II aims at improving the capacity of rural Filipinos to
make informed decisions about insurance. In a set of randomly selected communities
an awareness campaign was conducted and we assess the effects of this campaign on
insurance comprehension, perception towards and demand for insurance. We find no
evidence that the intervention improved knowledge in the short term but we detect
positive effects on the attitude towards insurance and on the awareness about issues
related to insurance in the campaign villages. Respondents who live in campaign vil-
lages but did not receive a brochure have significantly lower scores on the knowledge
test questions. This is in line with the hypothesis that issues of insurance are compli-
cated to grasp for low-income individuals and relying on social networks to transmit
insurance knowledge is prone to fail. It might create adverse affects. The second
chapter analyzes two interventions that aim at strengthening producer organizations
of farmers in Uganda. We find some evidence that farmers adapt their labor input
in aspiration of improved market access through their producer organization. The
farmers unleash formerly untapped household labor resources in anticipation of im-
proved transparency of the sales processes of their organization. In anticipation of
1
2relieved financial constraints at harvest time, the farmers increase their demand for
hired labor in crop production. Heterogeneous effects show that trust in the leaders
of the producer organization plays a decisive role for the interventions’ impact on
labor decisions. Contrary, to the initial hypothesis we cannot find evidence for a pos-
itive impact of the intervention on trust in the producer organization or its leaders.
Chapter IV and V both report the effect of formalization interventions conducted
by microfinance institutions. The interventions try to improve the knowledge of
informal entrepreneurs on the benefits of registering their income activities. We hy-
pothesize that formalization can benefit a distinct segment of informal entrepreneurs.
The first formalization intervention is implemented in India and succeeds in bringing
large parts of the treatment group to register their activities with official authorities.
The second intervention is implemented in Burkina Faso and fails to bring about
substantial change in the entrepreneurs’ official status. In Burkina we observe a
small positive impact on the degree of formality but cannot document an increase
in formal registrations. For neither of the two interventions we observe economi-
cally significant effects on second order outcomes that would support the hypothesis
that formality is advantageous. The large impact on the first order outcome, formal
status, indicates that such advantages must exist in India but are unobservable to
us. In Burkina, the intervention shows an initial positive effect that does not persist
over the period of investigation but rather fades off. This suggests that the formal
business environment is not sufficiently attractive for the microfinance clients.
CHAPTER II
The Impact of Insurance Literacy Education on
Knowledge, Attitude and Behavior - A
Randomized Controlled Trial
2.1 Introduction
Microinsurance is a promising tool to reduce the vulnerability of low-income
households in developing countries. However, microinsurance schemes tend to suffer
from low take-up (Dercon et al., 2008; Ito and Kono, 2010). Further, low usage and
retention in public and private schemes alike reflect the lack of acceptance of these
products among the target population. In part, demand side problems like lack
of understanding and lack of familiarity with the concept of insurance contribute
to the low demand (Cole et al., 2013; Gine´ et al., 2008)1. Financial education,
in theory, directly affects an individual’s financial comprehension and thereby aims
at improving the capability to make informed financial decisions. Evidence from
developed countries documents a strong positive link between financial literacy and
financial decision making (Duflo and Saez, 2003; Lusardi, 2012; Lusardi and Mitchell,
2011; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009; Sekita, 2011; van Rooij et al., 2011).
1Other possible reasons for low take-up are lack of trust in the insurer low quality of microinsur-
ance product or barriers that hinder the individual from buying, e.g. high direct or indirect costs.
The focus of the present study is solely on understanding and awareness of microinsurance
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4Despite the recently increased interest in financial literacy, the interventions that
try to improve it in developing countries remain relatively rare and the empirical
evidence that exists does not present a clear picture on the effectiveness of such en-
deavors (Holzmann, 2010). This holds also for the evidence on insurance literacy
interventions. Here the existing knowledge focuses on distinct groups, e.g. occupa-
tional groups, to promote specific insurance products. To our knowledge this is the
first rigorous evaluation of an insurance education campaign that targets the general
rural population in a developing country.
In developing countries, plain misconception or/and adverse attitude add to the
problems that prevent individuals from buying microinsurance products. Insurance
literacy education could be a remedy. This study presents evidence from a random-
ized controlled trial that assesses whether distributing insurance education material
can affect knowledge and attitude in a low-income population and whether this ul-
timately provokes changes in the demand for a health insurance product.
For the intervention an educative brochure was developed and distributed in a
randomly chosen set of villages. Within the treatment villages, henceforth also called
campaign villages, not all households received a brochure due to restricted funds.
Distribution was carried out in a campaign like manner, whereby the distributors had
instructions to skip households following a distribution key. Among the households
that did not receive a brochure some were later allocated to the campaign village
control group. Comparing this first control group to a second one drawn from non-
campaign villages allows estimation of a spill-over effect within the campaign villages.
We evaluate the effect of insurance literacy education on several outcomes. First,
we compare knowledge outcomes for treated and controls. We estimate the brochure’s
direct effect and the spillover effect on control households and find that the campaign
5fails to improve short-term knowledge of brochure recipients. Instead, we document
significant negative effects on the control group in campaign villages. This suggests
that the assessment of unintended negative spillover effects is essential as they might
distort the intended effects. Further, this finding creates doubt regarding the use of
social networks to promote financial litercy.
Secondly, we estimate the impact on attitude towards insurance. We observe
significant effects on brochure recipients and non-recipients from campaign villages
whereby the direct effect and the spill-over effect point in the same direction. Despite
the intervention’s success to provoke attitudinal change, we cannot document any
significant impact on our third outcome measure, take-up of a micro health insurance
product. We assess this outcome by matching our survey data with administrative
data from the national health insurer, PhilHealth. This allows us to estimate the
campaign’s impact on the individual level. Further, we analyze the membership in-
formation on the aggregate village level for the six months following the intervention.
On none of the two levels can we document any impact on PhilHealth registrations.
The effects on the different dimensions of attitude suggest, that the campaign did
not only increase awareness about the usefulness of insurance, it also created aware-
ness about the financial liability that an insurance contract brings about. Campaign
village respondents are more inclined to state that insurance is something expensive.
Further, an indicator measuring the perception of accessibility of insurance was af-
fected negatively. In part, this indicates that other obstacles to take-up exist besides
perception.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section discusses the existing
literature on financial education in general and for microinsurance in particular.
It puts our contribution in relation to the existing stock of knowledge. The third
6section presents the design and the implementation of the randomized controlled
trial. Section four presents the sample and section five the experimental results.
Section six concludes.
2.2 Motivation
Microinsurance like microcredit serves low income populations that are excluded
from traditional commercial financial products due to their socio-economic situation,
characterized by low irregular incomes, informal activities, low eduction, etc. Yet,
the case of microinsurance in terms of understanding and perception is a different
one from the case of microcredit. Microcredit builds on existing informal schemes,
i.e. rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) for group lending schemes or
moneylenders for individual lending. As a result, the target population is familiar
with the mechanisms that microcredit providers use. Traditional or informal insur-
ance mechanisms are based on reciprocity. Everybody contributing to the scheme
will benefit from it at some point in time (Churchill, 2002). A common example,
that exists also in the Philippines, are funeral groups which are informal associations
providing for the costs occurring from the death of a community member.
Microinsurance, like standard insurance, is based on the concept of risk pool-
ing where regular premium payments of all insured individuals cover the financial
losses of those suffering from an insured event. Those who are insured but remain
unaffected might never receive compensation nor reimbursement of the premium
payments they made during the contract. The target population’s lack of familiarity
with this mechanism creates room for misunderstanding and misconception. In addi-
tion, low education poses an obstacle to understanding terminology, contract details
7and procedures, thereby resulting in further discouragement to acquire an insurance
product.
Insurance literacy education is a potential way to remedy low familiarity, un-
derstanding and acceptance of microinsurance products. Hence, it might lead to
increased voluntary take-up of such products. The underlying causal chain is the
following: Increased education about insurance improves understanding and alters,
either subsequently or simultaneously, the attitude towards such products. These
changes improve the capacity to make informed decisions which might then trans-
late into increased take-up. The present work analyzes the entire causal chain. We
first look at whether knowledge and attitude can be affected and, secondly, study
whether the demand for a micro health insurance product changes as a result of
the educational campaign. Of course, this causal chain relies on underlying assump-
tion, e.g. no other barriers besides insurance knowledge and perception must exist.
Further, for the last link to hold it is neceassary that the available microinsurance
product can be considered a viable mean to protect households from financial risk
through health shocks.
For developing countries little evidence on the importance of financial literacy
exists (Holzmann, 2010). Cole et al. (2011) find high correlation between financial
literacy and the demand for financial services in Indonesia and India. This suggests
that also in a developing country context better understanding of financial products
could lead to increased demand.
Recently, several studies tried to assess whether education is an effective remedy
to low take-up of microfinance products. The results as well as the approaches are
mixed. Cole et al. (2011) study the causal effect of a financial education module
on the demand for financial products. Their results are insignificant for the general
8population but they report modest positive effects on take-up of savings accounts in
a sub-sample of individuals with low education.
Cai et al. (2011) evaluate the effect of insurance education on take-up of a rice
production insurance in China. They report significant positive effects on take-up
and a slightly lower but still significant spill-over effect on non-participants through
social interaction. Three particular features of the intervention they study need to
be mentioned. The insurance was offered to the participants immediately after the
training, solving problems of accessibility. The insurance premium was deducted
from an agricultural subsidy that all study subjects were eligible for, which solves
the problem of liquidity constraints. The study focused on a distinct group of rice
farmers and the training contained explanations of the specific product that was
offered. Cole et al. (2013) also look at take-up of an insurance product among
farmers, but they report contrary results as their education module had no effect on
take-up.
Carpena et al. (2011) focus on the link between education and understanding.
They find that education in itself does not improve understanding immediately and
that attitude towards financial products can be affected more easily. In that respect
their results are in line with our findings.
When it comes to financial (and insurance) literacy campaigns one needs to dif-
ferentiate general and product-specific education. On the one hand, general literacy
education and awareness campaigns address the target population’s unfamiliarity
with the concept of insurance and explain terminology, different insurance types and
benefits. Such campaigns do not promote specific insurers or their products. As a
result of diverse issues (e.g. free riding, low perceived value of literacy education,
mistrust in insurers, etc.) it is mostly the government or non-profit institutions that
9carry out such large scale interventions2. This type of intervention has a social rather
than a commercial character. On the other hand, product-specific insurance educa-
tion is closely related to traditional commercial marketing and mostly conducted
by insurance sales personnel. Such campaigns might also cover general insurance
terminology but ultimately aim at explaining and selling specific products. This
kind of customer education explains contractual features (e.g. premium payment or
claim procedures) and is important not only for increasing sales but also to prevent
customer dissatisfaction leading to low renewal rates. The commercial purpose of
such interventions is prevalent and most likely obvious to the target population. The
educator might even be motivated by commissions. Therefore, the effectiveness of
commercial insurance education on demand is subject also to the target population’s
trust or mistrust. One specific characteristic of the present study is that the edu-
cational campaign neither explains a specific product nor does it focus on a specific
occupational group.
In the analysis of financial education activities the intensity of the treatment is
also an important dimension. Intensity in the above mentioned studies varies from
weekly meetings over the period of several months to one-day training sessions of
several hours. We study an intervention that increased interest in issues of insurance
at the day of brochure distribution and, through the brochure, made information
available for a much longer period of time.
2In South Africa, for example, SAIA (South Africa Insurance Association) a conglomerate of
commercial insurers collects funds from all members to improve the general public’s insurance
understanding
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2.3 Experimental Design
In Fall 2010, we conducted the educational campaign in the region of Caraga
in the Philippines. Caraga is a mostly rural region on the island of Mindanao. In
2009, it had a poverty incidence of 45.9 percent making it the poorest region in the
country3. We selected 60 villages (barangay) that were easily accessible from the
provincial capital Butuan and that had a population of 800 to 2500 inhabitants. All
barangay are located close to the national highway in the provinces Agusan del Norte
and Agusan del Sur. Out of these, 34 were randomly chosen as campaign villages, i.e.
treatment villages. In the remaining 26 villages we interviewed control respondents.
In the campaign villages we distributed a brochure in a door-to-door manner similarly
to an awareness campaign. The distributors were allocated to different parts of the
village in teams of two. They had instructions to choose the recipients at their own
merit and to not provide direct neighbors with the brochure.
Only households where the head or the head’s spouse were available received
the brochure. Before handing over the brochure, the recipient answered a short
questionnaire with questions on insurance literacy and attitude which gives us an idea
of the initial knowledge and was supposed to raise interest of the respondent in issues
of insurance. The enumerator prepared a sketch of the household’s location so that
we would be able to relocate it for the follow-up interview. On average, 60 brochures
were handed out per barangay and it was not announced that we would visit again
for an extensive follow-up survey one week later. While the short questionnaire gives
us an idea on the level of understanding and attitude in the treatment group, it
cannot serve as a baseline since we did not conduct this ”delivery survey” with the
control group.
3See http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2009/tables_basic.asp.
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A week after distribution we revisited the campaign villages, conducted the follow-
up survey with the recipient households and selected the control group among the
non-recipient households. This group of respondents, henceforth called control group
I, was likely to be affected by the campaign via social interaction, i.e. spill-over. In
addition, we surveyed a second control group in control villages, henceforth called
control group II. Surveying individuals from villages where no brochure was dis-
tributed precludes contamination of the control group which would otherwise bias
our impact estimates. It also allows us to quantify the spill-over effects on knowledge
and attitude that occurred within the campaign villages by comparing control group
I - with spill-over effects - to the unaffected controls.
The brochure was initially developed by the German International Cooperation
(GIZ) in Ghana. We adopted it to the setting of the Philippines. Its purpose is
to raise awareness and understanding of the benefits and processes of insurance.
Using a comic and simple text in the local language it explains the main processes
of insurance using the example of a health insurance. It also contains explanations
on insurance terminology and other types of insurances (e.g. life insurance, etc.).
Table 2.1 reports the total numbers of brochure recipients and respondents. In
total we distributed 2243 brochures. Only 1563 recipient households were revisited
for the follow-up interview. From the outset we decided to distribute more brochures
than the number of intended follow-up interviews. In this way, we wanted to prevent
that attrition creates a reduction of the final sample size. A total of 680 brochure
recipients were not selected for the follow-up visit and dropped out.
The design of the brochure’s cover page is the second treatment. It features four
messages each emphasizing a different motive for insurance take-up. We random-
ized these messages on the household level and tested for sensitivity of knowledge
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Table 2.1: Number of distributed brochures and interviews
Control barangay Campaign barangay
Control households (only follow-up) 461 609
Brochure recipients (only before) 680
Brochure recipients (before and follow-up) 1,563
Total 461 2,852
and attitude. The four different messages featured solidarity, optimism, trust and
protection (See the design of the brochure in Figures 2.2 - 2.4 in the Appendix).
We also included one design that has a blank cover and which does not allude to
any message. We cannot find any significant effects and therefore the results on the
messages are not reported in the following.
2.4 Socio-Economic and Demographic Summary Statistics
Table 2.2 displays summary statistics according to treatment status. Columns
1 to 4 present averages for all respondents residing in campaign villages (T=1, i.e.
brochure and control I respondents), for brochure respondents only (TT=1, i.e. vil-
lage was treated and household was treated), for respondents from campaign villages
who did not receive a brochure (TT=0, i.e. village was treated but not household),
and for control respondents from control villages (T=0, i.e. neither village nor house-
hold were treated), respectively. In the last two columns we present p-values of t-tests
that compare the mean of brochure recipients to the respective control group.
The sample consists of households engaging in low income formal and informal
activities. On average the household head is about 42 years old, has around eight
years of education and is male in 90 percent of the cases. The most prevalent income
sources are farming and service provision. Almost 50 percent of the households claim
to have some income from self-employed activities.
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Access to commercial financial products is low in general. Only about 10 percent
of the sample state that they have a bank account. As for insurance coverage, we
observe that the share of PhilHealth members is high at 73 percent of which approx-
imately half are paying members. The paying members are either enrolled through
their employment, if the household has any income from formal employment, or vol-
untary members. Those who are not paying members are enrolled in PhilHealth’s
Sponsored Program which is offered free of charge for indigent households. These
results vary highly from what we observed in a study conducted in the same region
one year earlier in September 2009. At that time we found that merely 15 percent
of the households were covered by PhilHealth. From anecdotal evidence we learned
that in preparation of the super election year 2010, when elections were held on ev-
ery administrative level in the Philippines, temporary PhilHealth memberships were
distributed by candidates. The high level of enrollment sharply reduces our chances
of measuring an effect on take-up.
Regarding the balancing by treatment group, we observe some variables that
are significantly different in means between the recipient and the control group.
Within the campaign villages, we find that the share of mobile phone owners is
significantly higher for brochure recipients compared to controls. We observe that
contact to barangay officials is significantly higher at the 10 percent significance level.
Partly, the difference in this self reported measure might result directly from the
intervention. After our first visit in the village, barangay officials might have visited
brochure recipient households to inquire about the visit of our brochure distributors,
especially so because the elections for the post of the barangay captain were coming
up when we conducted the campaign. Additional evidence for this assumption is
provided by comparing recipients and control group II. In control group II the share
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of respondents who have contact to officials is 7 percent lower and the mean difference
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Without explanation remains the difference in shock history between recipients
and control group I. Among the recipients 34 percent report a death or a hospitaliza-
tion in the last three months (Shock history=1) compared to only 26 percent in the
control group I which is highly significant. Between control group II and the treat-
ment group we do not observe a statistically significant difference. One might argue
that control group I underreports such health events which might result directly from
the treatment.
Comparing recipients and control group II reveals a priori differences for a few
variables: Fewer female heads, higher schooling of the head and higher number of
children. Enrollment in PhilHealth, access to bank accounts, land ownership and
reported shocks are all balanced. The parametric analysis allows us to control for
the imbalances.
2.4.1 Non-PhilHealth Members
Since our interest is on the campaign’s effect on take-up of insurance we also dis-
play the summary statistics for respondents who are not yet enrolled with PhilHealth
(Table 2.3). One striking difference between the full sample and the non-PhilHealth
sample is the higher share of female household heads among the latter, i.e. the unin-
sured. This indicates a correlation between the gender of the household head and
insurance membership. More formal employment among men might offer one expla-
nation for this difference. PhilHealth is mandatory for formally employed. In the
case were formal employment is higher among men, female household heads might
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be insured less often. We rather observe the reversed situation in non-campaign
villages. Here, the small sample size calls for caution.
As to the balancing, we only observe two variables that differ significantly between
the treatment group and the respective control group. These are Female head which
is up to 15 percent lower and Mobile phone. For the latter, we observe approximately
60 percent of the treatment group and control group II who own a mobile phone while
this share is only at 45 percent in control group I. With the exception of gender of
the household head, the main demographic variables, i.e. age, schooling and number
of children are balanced in the non-PhilHealth sample.
2.4.2 Female Respondents
The majority of respondents is female. This is not a result of the sampling strat-
egy but rather related to the survey implementation. We conducted our interviews
during the morning and the early afternoon. At this time of the day only few male
household heads are available. Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the female
sub-sample, i.e. the sample excluding all male respondents. The results are fairly
similar to those based on the entire sample.
2.5 Experimental Results
This section presents the impact results of the insurance literacy campaign. All
estimated effects reflect Intention-to-Treat (ITT) effects since we observe whether
the household received a brochure but not whether the respondent really took time
to study it. Each of the three following subsections presents mean comparisons of
the outcome indicators and estimation results.
The first subsection looks at the impact on insurance literacy. We construct
indices from a battery of knowledge questions that assess the level of insurance
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comprehension. The second subsection looks at the effect on attitude. Here we
apply explorative multivariate analysis to construct factors from questionnaire items
that capture the respondent’s attitude towards insurance.
The third subsection addresses the impact on behavior. We describe the microin-
surance product that PhilHealth offers and use administrative data to assess the
effect on new membership registrations. We study a period of six months following
the education intervention. Again we present mean comparisons as well as ITT esti-
mations. We complement the individual level analysis by looking at the campaign’s
effect on the barangay level.
2.5.1 The Impact on Knowledge
We assess the respondent’s comprehension of procedures, terminology and ben-
efits of insurance. At the day of the campaign (before handing over the brochure)
we asked the recipients three knowledge and three attitude questions. These ques-
tions are a subset of the questions included in the follow-up survey4. They serve
two purposes. First, we are able to test whether individuals selected to receive a
brochure and selected to respond to the follow-up survey differ from those who were
only selected to receive the brochure but were not interviewed at follow-up. This
is important to ascertain that no selection occurred at this stage. Second, we can
compare the initial knowledge and attitude of our treated sample to the control II
sample.
Initial Knowledge
Table 2.5 presents the average scores for the knowledge test questions at the day
of distribution. Column 1 lists the average of correct responses from all brochure
4See the knowledge test questionnaire items in Figure 2.8 in the Appendix.
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recipients. In Column 2 we find the average for the group of respondents interviewed
at delivery and at follow-up. Column 3 lists the results for respondents interviewed
only at delivery and Column 4 presents the averages for control group II.
We observe that control group II has significantly higher average results for two
out of three questions. For the first question we find a small difference of 4 percent
that is significant at the 10 percent level. For the third question however 75 percent
of control group II answered correctly compared to only 60 percent of the recipient
group. No significant difference exists for the second question but still the sum of
correct questions is significantly higher in control group II.
This would suggest that control group II has better knowledge from the outset.
However, one has to point out that a problem of internal validity might contribute to
this difference. The survey situation for the two groups was quite different putting
the brochure recipients at a disadvantage. At the day of brochure distribution,
the enumerators introduced themselves, and then, on the door step, confronted the
recipients immediately with the test questions. Control group II, on the other hand,
sat down with the enumerator and gave a full interview during which the three
questions came up as part of a whole battery of questions. This gives rise to doubt
whether the two results are comparable.
The mean results between the treatment group and the recipients who were not
interviewed at follow-up show no significant differences. Here the interview situation
was the same, so we can rule out that the group selected for the follow-up survey
was better informed than those who received only the brochure.
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Knowledge at Follow-up
Table 2.7 reports test results from the follow-up survey. It shows averages of
correct test questions by treatment group in Columns 1-4 and p-values from t-tests
of mean comparisons in Columns 5-8. We test for significant differences in means
comparing brochure recipients to spill-over controls in Column 5. In Column 6 we
compare recipients with controls from control villages and in Column 7 we report
the p-value of a t-test between control I and control II respondents. In Column 8 we
compare all campaign village respondents to those from control villages.
The item in the first row is a subjective and self-assessed measure that asked the
respondents to rate how familiar they feel with issues of insurance. We observe a
significant difference between brochure recipients and control group I. It is important
to mention that these are often direct neighbors, yet 68 percent of the brochure
recipients compared to only 57 percent of the non-recipients state to have an idea
about how insurance works. The difference is statistically significantly at the 1
percent level. In contrast to this, there is no difference in this item between brochure
recipients and controls from non-campaign villages. Two interpretations can be
brought forward. Either, the randomization on the village level was unsuccessful,
meaning the control II respondents had a higher subjective familiarity from the outset
and the campaign had a positive impact which reduced the gap between brochure
recipients and control II respondents to virtually zero. Or, the campaign had no effect
at all or only a very small effect on the recipients’ confidence and instead caused an
unintended negative impact on the campaign village control group. In that case it
was the fact of not receiving the informational material while some neighbors did,
what significantly affected the subjective easiness towards insurance of control group
I.
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The items in Rows 2-13 are indicator variables for correct answers on the objective
literacy test questions. Rows 14-17 show different indices constructed from these
questions. Index All is the sum of correct answers from all knowledge questions.
Index Brochure is the sum of correct answers to questions that had been explicitly
explained in the brochure. Index PhilHealth sums up the correct answers on the
questions concerning PhilHealth directly. The Literacy index is the sum of all but
three questions that we found to be ambiguous5.
The recipient group has on average 6.65 correct answers when all questions are
considered and 5.13 when we exclude the ambiguous items. Both outcomes, the
Index All and the Literacy index, are significantly higher for the brochure recipients
(assigned) as compared to control group I. However, comparing brochure recipients
and control group II does not reveal any difference in insurance knowledge. The
impacts on subjective and objective knowledge could result from negative spill-over
effects which undermines the hypothesis that social interaction is beneficial for the
diffusion of insurance knowledge.
Test Scores by Gender
Table 2.8 displays the impact on insurance knowledge by gender of the respon-
dent. For men and women, the self-assessed knowledge is lower in control group I
than in the brochure group. The difference is larger among men with 14 percent
5Question 1: ”No pay no coverage - If you have an insurance and you are late with your payments
or do not pay, the insurance does not help you when you have a problem.” This question is ambiguous
since members of PhilHealth’s Sponsored Program do not pay and are insured anyways. Question
2: ”Inform insurer - If you have an insurance, you need to contact your insurer if something happens
that is covered by the insurance.” This question is ambiguous since claims under PhilHealth can be
processed by the individual or by the hospital. This means that a PhilHealth member with valid
membership information benefits automatically and it is the hospital who handles the claim with
PhilHealth. Question 3: ”PhilHealth availability - PhilHealth membership-cards are accepted in
every hospital.” This is an ambiguous question because even though PhilHealth membership is only
valid in accredited hospitals almost all of the hospitals in the region are accredited.
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compared to 10 percent among women. In both sub-samples the difference is highly
statistically significant and indicates that non-recipients are less confident about in-
surance issues than brochure recipients. The objective test results are slightly higher
for male respondents, which indicates a gender gap in knowledge. Further, for male
respondents we cannot document the negative spill-over effect on knowledge.
Among female respondents the brochure recipients have significantly better re-
sults on the Literacy index and Index All than control group I. Again, comparing
brochure recipients and controls from non-campaign villages shows no effect of the
brochure. Apparently, female respondents drive the negative spill-over effects on
insurance knowledge within campaign villages. We need to stress that the female
sample is much larger than the male sample leading to more precise estimates.
The differences in the effects across gender raise the question why women who
did not receive a brochure lose out by as much on the objective knowledge measures
while we cannot observe a similar pattern for men. Male controls in campaign vil-
lages respond to not receiving a brochure with a significant decrease in the subjective
measure, too, but not in the objective tests. In the case where information distor-
tion explains the negative spill-over effect, one could argue that men, due to higher
knowledge, are less susceptible to faulty information or that they are less exposed to
it due to absence from the household during day time.
Test Scores by Insurance Status
The national social health insurer PhilHealth offers three different types of mem-
bership. Formally employed individuals are obliged by law to enroll under the Em-
ployed Sector Program (EP) and informal sector households can enroll voluntarily in
the Individually Paying Program (IPP). Indigent households enroll in the Sponsored
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Program (SP). While coverage and benefit structure are the same in all three pro-
grams the Sponsored Program is free of charge. Eligibility for this program depends
on the household’s income and living situation and is granted if the Department
for Social Welfare and Development classifies the household in the lowest income
quantile6. In the following we class membership into two types: paying members
including formally employed and individually paying members and non-paying mem-
bers including those with sponsored membership, i.e. either SP membership or IPP
membership payed by someone else.
In Table 2.9 we observe that controls enrolled in PhilHealth, regardless whether
paying or non-paying, have higher subjective familiarity with insurance and higher
test scores than uninsured controls. We observe that regardless of insurance status
the brochure recipients are more likely to state that they have an idea about insur-
ance. For the objective test results, we also observe that control group I looses out
as compared to the brochure group. Yet, the difference in the Literacy Index is only
significant for the insured who are actually paying and not for the uninsured nor the
insured-for-free sub-samples. It is important to mention here, that the precision of
the mean estimates is much lower in all sub-samples.
When we look at brochure recipients and compare the level of self assessed fa-
miliarity across membership status, we see that among the uninsured around 57
percent state to have an idea about insurance compared to over 70 percent among
the insured. Interestingly, a look at the objective knowledge tests reveals that the
level of knowledge is quite similar for the uninsured who score on average 4.94 on
the Literacy index and those who are insured for free, who score 4.98. This result
is backed by anecdotal evidence from PhilHealth and barangay health center staff:
6Membership in the Sponsored Program is payed by PhilHealth and the local government or by
philanthropic institutions or individuals.
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Those insured for free are not familiar with the insurance product at their disposal
and therefore do not use or, when they try to use it, make disappointing experiences
as it does not cover the services they thought it would. Those who are insured and
pay for it, on the other hand, score about 5.42 on average.
Estimation Strategy
We complement the means comparison by regression analysis taking into account
individual characteristics of the respondents. Our estimations follow the model
(2.1) Yi = α + βBrochurei + γSpilloveri + θXi + ui
where Yi is the insurance literacy measure of interest, Brochurei is an indicator
variable that captures whether the household has received a brochure and Spilloveri
takes value one for non-recipient households from campaign villages (control group
I). In Xi we include the covariates age and gender of the household head, gender of
the respondent and indicators for the household’s income generating activities. All
covariates included in the regressions where collected at the follow-up interview. We
do not control for PhilHealth membership or type of PhilHealth membership since
these were assessed post-treatment and might have been affected by the treatment.
Estimation Results
Table 2.10 presents OLS estimation results of equation 2.1. Receiving a brochure
shows no significant effect on the Literacy Index, neither in the full sample (panel A)
nor in the female sample (panel B). This gives evidence for the ineffectiveness of the
treatment as to improving the target group’s capacity to make informed decisions
about issues of insurance. Alarming, however, are the coefficient estimates for the
spill-over effect. Not receiving a brochure in a campaign village has a negative and
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significant impact in most specifications. The size of this effect is small - one-third
of a correct question in the female sample - its significance disappears after inclusion
of additional covariates, i.e. an indicator whether recently a household member died
or was confined to the hospital, ownership of a vehicle to capture wealth and the
number of children. The results are very similar when we consider the impact on
Index All in Table 2.11. As mentioned earlier, shock history might potentially be
endogenous as brochure distribution might have affected the recall behavior.
Table 2.12 displays coefficient estimates from linear probability models where the
specific knowledge items are plugged in as dependent variables. Only few coeffi-
cients are significantly different from zero, but we observe that eight out of twelve
estimations result in negative estimates of the spill-over effect. If we estimate these
coefficients on basis of the female sample we obtain negative estimates for ten of the
twelve items (Table 2.13). In the regressions with ”Know 4 - Inform Insurer” and
”Know 5 - Money Back” as respective dependent variable, the brochures’ impact and
the spill-over coefficient are negative and significantly different from zero.
Heterogeneous Effects
Simple analysis of mean results potentially hides changes that occur in the dis-
tribution of the test results. Figure 2.1 presents kernel density estimate of the distri-
bution. It shows the number of correct knowledge test questions on the x-axes and
the share of respondents who scored that many correct questions on the y-axes. The
most frequent number of correct questions was five for the brochure recipients and
control group I. For control group II the mode is four but the share of respondents
scoring five correct questions is only marginally smaller. When it comes to scores
above six the brochure recipients have strictly higher fractions than both control
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groups. The general picture indicates a shift of the recipient distribution towards
higher test scores. We do not report here probit regressions that we ran to test
whether an impact occurred on the probability to score above six correct knowledge
questions. These regressions resulted in insignificant effects and, thus, did not con-
firm the hypothesis that brochure recipients scored better on the higher end of the
test score distribution, as the right shift in the distribution would suggest.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Literacy index in different treatment groups
Discussion of Spill-over Effect on Knowledge
The negative externalities that the campaign potentially created for non-participants
cannot be ignored. We offer two explanations for the negative spill-over effect: lack of
confidence and social interaction. The first explanation is based on the respondent’s
subjective assessment of knowledge. Non-recipients significantly assess their knowl-
edge to be lower compared to brochure recipients. They show a lack of confidence
that results from the fact that they had not been selected to receive the brochure.
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This lack of self-esteem might influence their capacity to respond correctly to the
test questions. The literature on stereotype threat documents a similar phenomenon.
Hoff and Pandey (2004) find that affiliation to a group that is stigmatized to be
less knowledgeable reduces scores in objective tests. The mechanism they identified
might be similar to what we observe in our study. Public knowledge of affiliation to
the stigmatized group affects performance in a cognitive task.
Our interview protocol gave the instruction to start interviews of control group I
respondents always with the question whether the household had received a brochure
the week before. In this way affiliation to a group became public. Other than in the
stereotype threat literature we do not control for the setting in which the interview
was conducted. We are not aware if the interviewer was alone with the respondent
or in company of family, friends and neighbors. One might suspect heterogeneity
according to the setting. However, in this regard no structural differences should
exist by treatment status.
The second explanation focuses on social interaction. When recipients and non-
recipients discuss the content of the brochure, misconception might arise due to the
treatment group’s incapacity to explain issues of insurance correctly. Especially,
brochure recipients unfamiliar with the issue might give incorrect summaries of what
is presented in the brochure. As a consequence, the mere forwarding of the brochure’s
content causes the observed distortion that puts non-recipients at a disadvantage.
Again, we cannot test this hypothesis, since we have only incomplete information on
whether control group I obtained information on the brochure.
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2.5.2 The Impact on Attitude
In the following we analyze the impact on attitude towards insurance. We assess
attitude using the concept of semantic differential. The respondents rated 19 pairs of
bipolar adjectives on a scale ranging from -2 to 27. The adjectives referred either to
”Insurance in general” or to ”Buying health insurance”. The mean comparisons are
presented in Table 2.16. For reasons of space the table lists only one adjective of the
bipolar pair, i.e. the one that was coded with value 2, while the opposing adjective,
coded with -2, is omitted here. Items one to twelve refer to ”Insurance in general”
and items 13 to 19 refer to ”Buying Health Insurance”8.
Attitude at Day of Campaign
Table 2.14 presents average results for attitude on the day of the campaign.
Column 5 gives the average score for all households that received a brochure, Column
6 gives the average for recipient households that were also interviewed at follow-up
and that constitute now our treatment group. Column 7 lists the results for the group
of recipients that was not selected for follow-up and, for comparison, we include in
Column 8 the average of control group II, that was not exposed to spill-over effects.
It shows that the three items asked at distribution are well balanced across the
different groups. All groups rate insurance in general as something rather positive,
rather simple and valuable. Control group II has the same perception at the full
survey.
7E.g. positive (2) - rather positive (1) - neither positive nor negative (0) - rather negative (-1) -
negative (-2).
8The exact survey questions were ”How do you feel towards insurance in general?” and ”How
do you feel towards buying health insurance?” See the original questions in section 2.9
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Empirical Analysis
The large number of attitude variables makes it difficult to interpret the impact
of the campaign in a sensible manner. To overcome this problem, we apply a factor
analysis (FA) that determines underlying, latent variables, called factors9. This
method attempts to explain the covariation that we observe in our attitude variables,
then groups variables with similar variation into sets according to a latent factor,
and thereby reduces the dimensionality of the data and renders interpretation easier.
For person i we have,
(2.2) yij = λj1fi1 + λj2fi2 + ...+ λjkfik + eij
where yij is the observed information that respondent i gave on the j = 1, ..., p
questions, fik are the k = 1, ...,m latent, unobserved factors, and λjk are the respec-
tive loadings of factor fik for variable yij. The eij are residuals that have zero mean
and are not correlated to the factors. In this fashion, we run two separate factor
analyses, one for the first twelve items capturing the attitude towards ”Insurance in
general” and the other one for the remaining seven items that assess the attitude
towards ”Buying health insurance”.
We identify three factors that account for most of the variance in the items on
”Insurance in general”10. Table 2.17 shows the loading of each variable on the three
different factors. A higher absolute loading indicates greater importance of the vari-
able for the factor and a positive sign indicates a positive relation between the factor
and the variable. As above, the listed adjective takes on value 2 and the omitted
9See Kim and Mueller (1978) for a detailed description of factor analysis.
10As suggested by the literature on factor analysis we select only those factors with Eigenvalue
greater than one.
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opposite takes on value -2. For factor 1 the most relevant pairs of adjectives are
”unfair - fair”, ”unreliable - reliable”, ”unnecessary - necessary”, ”risky - safe” and
”wasteful - beneficial”. We interpret this factor as capturing issues of security. Fac-
tor 2 is mostly defined by ”positive - negative”, ”poor - rich”, ”worthless - valuable”,
”complicated - simple” and ”powerless - powerful”. The interpretation of this fac-
tor is not straightforward as these variables have no ”common denominator”, which
leads us to label the factor as diffuse. Factor 3 is most straightforward to interpret
as the variables with highest loadings, ”unaffordable - affordable” and ”expensive -
cheap”, obviously capture financial issues. We modify the factor loadings by setting
the loadings to zero for all variables that have negligible loading for the specific fac-
tor. This reduces variation after having determined the underlying factors. This is
an arbitrary decision but given that we do so for all three groups it does not affect
internal validity of our experiment.
After identification of the latent factors, we turn to the estimation of the cam-
paign’s impact on attitude. We estimate Equation 2.1 separately for each modified
factor as dependent variable. Table 2.19 shows that we obtain highly significant
estimates for the brochure’s effect and for the spill-over effect. For all factors, the
two effects point in the same direction leading us to conclude that the campaigning
has affected the attitude within campaign villages similarly, regardless of whether a
household received a brochure or not.
The estimates of both, the brochure’s direct impact and the spill-over effect on
Factor 1, are positive and significant. This indicates that the campaign increased the
general perception of insurance being something beneficial, security enhancing. It is
important to mention that the spill-over effect is larger in magnitude than the direct
effect on most factors. One could interpret this as the control I respondents com-
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pensation for their lower subjective knowledge. Factor 3 for ”Insurance in general”
has highest loading for ”affordable” and ”cheap” and is affected negatively by the
intervention. This means, as a result of the treatment, campaign village respondents
are less inclined towards these adjectives when rating the financial side of insurance.
The negative estimates suggest an increased reluctance to underrate the financial
commitment of insuring oneself. In other words, one could conclude that brochure
distribution has raised the recipients’ cautiousness as to the financial commitment
an insurance contract brings about.
The FA on the semantic differential items for ”Buying health insurance” results
in two factors (Table 2.18). For items ”good”, ”wise” and ”useful” factor 1 has
the highest loadings. For variables ”easy” and ”close” it is factor 2. The first
factor captures the worthiness of buying health insurance, the second captures issues
of accessibility. Regression analyses of these factors on brochure assignment, the
spillover and other covariates are presented in Table 2.21.
For ”Buying Health Insurance” the worthiness factor was affected significantly
positive. For factor 2, on the other hand, brochure and spillover effect have negative
coefficients. This suggests that the feeling of how accessible health insurance is, was
affected negatively. Putting this together one could conclude that the campaign
created an increased perception of how useful health insurance is, but also raised
awareness about the lack of accessibility to insurance.
In Table 2.21 we look at the effect on the specific attitude items. The accessibility
factor has highest loading for the pair of adjectives ”difficult - easy”. The impact on
this item is negative but insignificant for both, the direct and the spill-over effect.
For the second item of this factor, ”far-close”, we estimate negative impacts as well,
now with a significant impact on brochure recipients only.
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2.5.3 The Impact on Insurance Take-up
We assess the effect of the campaign on actual behavior by looking at take-up of
two PhilHealth products designed for the low-income sector: The Individually Paying
Program (IPP) and the Sponsored Program (SP). We use PhilHealth’s administrative
records on new registrations for these two programs. The data covers the period of
six months succeeding the campaign. The data is not restricted to our experimental
villages, it also contains villages where we did not distribute the brochure or conduct
interviews. In order to avoid confusion we call the control II villages henceforth
”interview villages” and the additional set of villages ”pure control villages”.
Including this group of control villages has two advantages: When estimating the
impact on take-up on the barangay level we can improve the power of our tests by
increasing the number of controls above the number of villages comprised by our set
of ”interview” villages (Duflo et al., 2008). Second, even though we did not distribute
brochures in the control II villages it is mere interviewing by itself that might affect
subsequent behavior which could bias our estimates (Zwane et al., 2011). At least
on the barangay level we can avoid this source of bias by comparing campaign and
unaffected control villages.
Inclusion of the control villages also has a drawback. As pointed out in Section
2.3 the experimental villages, i.e. the campaign and interview villages, where selected
for their accessibility. For the pure control villages data availability does not allow
us to identify how remote those villages are. Consequently, it can not be ruled out
that the experimental sites and the pure control villages are inherently different in
this indicator. We are only able to exclude villages that are of different population
size than our initial sample.
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In the following, we first estimate the campaign’s effect on the village level using
administrative data exclusively. Then we estimate the impact on the individual level
where we match the recipient, control I and control II respondents to the adminis-
trative data.
Take-up on Barangay Level
PhilHealth registered 353 new members in the campaign villages, 280 new mem-
bers in the interview villages and 755 new members in the 197 pure control villages
(Table 2.22). Around 41 percent of the new registrations in the campaign villages
are new SP members. In the interview villages this share is slightly higher at 48.5
percent and in the pure control villages it is at only 8 percent.
Table 2.23 shows averages by type of village. We observe on average ten new
members in the experimental villages, i.e. the campaign and interview villages, and
only 4.3 new members in the pure control villages. Given that the set of control
villages might potentially be very different from the experimental sites we need to
stress that the significant difference likely suffers from bias. In the experimental
villages we see that 6 of the ten new enrollees are in the IPP and 4 in the SP.
Using data on barangay population size we calculate take-up rates, i.e. the share
of new enrollees in the barangay population11. The take-up rates are below 1 percent
for all products. For IPP the take- up rate in campaign and inerview villages are
significantly different from the pure control villages. The SP take-up in campaign
villages is significantly different as compared to the pure control villages. Despite
this, the magnitude of the coefficient and of the difference in means rules out eco-
nomic significance. Though not displayed in the table, any t-test comparing take-up
between campaign and interview villages results in insignificant differences.
11Source: http://www.nscb.gov.ph
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Take-up on Individual Level
We use the individual-level data from our follow-up survey and individual records
of new PhilHealth members to assess the impact on the individual level. A main
obstacle is the matching of our survey data with the administrative records. We apply
the soundex-algorithm implemented in STATA to identify the names of brochure
recipients and control respondents from our survey in the administrative data.
Out of our 711 respondents not enrolled with PhilHealth at the time of the follow-
up we are able to match 2 percent as newly registered members in the six months
following the campaign. Table 2.24 presents the average take-up rates by treatment
status. Among brochure recipients and control I respondents alike the take-up rate
of 1 percent is significantly lower than it is in the control II sample where it is at 4
percent. Again, SP take-up is more important than IPP take-up. This result suggests
that ”interviewing” has an even higher impact than brochure distribution. However,
the regression analyses show that this effect is not robust as significance vanishes once
we control for individual characteristics. We estimate different specifications. Tables
2.25-2.27 present linear probability Models (LPM) estimates and logistic regression
results with total take-up, IPP and SP take-up as dependent variable. We run the
regression on a sample consisting only of respondents from campaign villages (TT=1
w/o T=0) and on a sample consisting only of brochure recipients and control II
respondents from interview villages (T=1 w/o TT=0). Neither LPM nor logistic
specifications produce significant coefficients. Further, we estimate random-effects
panel models (LPM and logistic) in Tables 2.28-2.30 that fail equally to provide any
evidence for an impact on take-up of the two products.
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2.6 Conclusion
This evaluation exercise analyzes whether insurance knowledge distribution in the
general public can affect knowledge of, attitude towards and take-up of insurance.
Our randomized experiment cannot provide evidence for a positive effect on knowl-
edge in the short term on treated households. In addition to this, a second downside
to the campaign are negative spill-over effects on the subjective and objective eas-
iness with insurance of untreated households in campaign villages. While treated
households do not fare better in the test results than an unaffected control popula-
tion, the campaign village controls end up having lower self-rated comprehension of
issues of insurance and lower test results.
We propose two explanations for the emergence of the unintended negative effects
on test scores. First, anticipation of control households to fare worse in the tests self
fulfills. And second, after the campaign, information diffuses in the village and
incorrect statements spread which affect untreated households. While our paper
fails to provide detailed insight into the process causing the negative spill-over, it
calls for caution on unintended spillover effects caused by social interaction. From
a methodological point of view, our results show that such effects, if not explicitly
investigated, can influence experimental results and lead to wrong conclusions.
From an ethical point of view, our study shows that there is an important need to
assess the effects that interventions can have on untreated subjects. A phenomenon
similar to our unintended negative spill-over on knowledge is documented by Kremer
and Miguel (2007). They report that more direct social ties to people that used
deworming drugs reduced attitude among people who were not treated initially. We
conclude that the effects created by social interaction can lie beyond the studies’
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realm of observation. Obviously, when treated and untreated individuals interact
any impact assessment needs to incorporate efforts to capture unintended spill-over
effects rigorously.
The positive impact on attitude that we observe equally calls for caution. The
inefficiency of financial education interventions in developing countries coupled with
their positive effect on perception might cause uninformed decision making. A pri-
ori, this is not an undesirable result. A policymaker keen on improving take-up of
microinsurance might want to rely on insurance education to reap the advantages of
improved perception despite the lack of improvement in testable short-term knowl-
edge. If however customer protection is weak and if the target population lacks
access to institutions where complaints can be settled uninformed take-up might be
disadvantageous.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics by group
Campaign villages
All Brochure HH Control I Control II p-value of t-test
(T=1) (TT=1) (TT=0) (T=0) (2)-(3) (2)-(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age head 41.50 41.55 41.37 41.34 0.69 0.67
(se) 0.20 0.24 0.39 0.44
Female head 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.53 0.03
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Schooling head 8.17 8.20 8.12 8.55 0.61 0.04
(se) 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.15
Schooling spouse 8.64 8.69 8.52 8.70 0.23 0.94
(se) 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.15
No of children 2.84 2.84 2.82 3.03 0.83 0.05
(se) 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09
PhilHealth member 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.58 0.50
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Paying for Philhealth 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.67 0.36
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Bank account 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.76
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Landowner 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.43
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Mobile phone 0.62 0.63 0.58 0.62 0.02 0.63
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Motor cycle/car 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.40 0.38
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Selfemployed 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.41 0.87
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Permanent 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.21 0.27
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Remittances abroad 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.94 0.35
(se) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Contact w/ officials 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.82 0.09 0.00
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Shock history 0.32 0.34 0.26 0.31 0.00 0.17
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Observations 2095 1505 590 447
Note: Column (1) includes all respondents from campaign villages. Column (2) includes only
brochure recipients. Column (3) includes controls from campaign villages. Column (4) includes
households from control villages. Columns (5) and (6) present p-values of t-test
comparing brochure recipients with the two control groups, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics by group (Non-PhilHealth households)
Campaign villages
All Brochure HH Control I Control II p-value of t-test
(T=1) (TT=1) (TT=0) (T=0) (2)-(3) (2)-(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age head 40.63 40.54 40.86 41.11 0.72 0.58
(se) 0.41 0.47 0.78 0.97
Female head 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.04 0.30 0.00
(se) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Schooling head 8.02 7.97 8.14 7.98 0.55 0.97
(se) 0.13 0.15 0.24 0.27
Schooling spouse 8.25 8.23 8.30 8.60 0.81 0.21
(se) 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.28
No of children 2.55 2.51 2.67 2.68 0.35 0.39
(se) 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.17
Bank account 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.93 0.80
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Landowner 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.92
(se) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04
Mobile phone 0.55 0.59 0.45 0.62 0.00 0.58
(se) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05
Motor cycle/car 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.46 0.33
(se) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Selfemployed 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.13
(se) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05
Permanent 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.91 0.11
(se) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Remittances abroad 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.76 0.51
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Contact w/ officials 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.82 0.17 0.27
(se) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Shock history 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.53 0.52
(se) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Observations 575 409 166 114
Note: The table includes only households not enrolled with PhilHealth at follow-up interview.
The first column (T=1) includes all respondents from campaign villages. The second column
(TT=1) includes only brochure recipients. The third column (TT=0) includes controls from
campaign villages. The fourth column (T=0) includes households from control villages.
Columns (5) and (6) present p-values of t-tests comparing brochure recipients with
controls either from campaign villages or from control villages, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics by group (Female sample)
Campaign villages
All Brochure HH Control I Control II p-value of t-test
(T=1) (TT=1) (TT=0) (T=0) (2)-(3) (2)-(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age head 41.82 41.78 41.92 42.01 0.79 0.69
(se) 0.24 0.28 0.43 0.51
Female head 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.66 0.01
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Schooling head 8.12 8.12 8.12 8.55 0.98 0.02
(se) 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.17
Schooling spouse 8.59 8.66 8.46 8.86 0.20 0.24
(se) 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.16
No of children 2.95 2.96 2.94 3.06 0.84 0.39
(se) 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10
PhilHealth member 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.15 0.83
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Paying for PhilHealth 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.31
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Bank account 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.83
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Landowner 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Mobile phone 0.63 0.65 0.59 0.63 0.01 0.48
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Motor cycle/car 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.49 0.17
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Selfemployed 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.47 0.38 0.68
(se) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Trade 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.08 0.00
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Permanent 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.20 0.09
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Remittances abroad 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.80 0.61
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Contact w/ officials 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.22 0.02
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Shock history 0.31 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.05
(se) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Observations 1557 1068 489 337
Note: Column (1) includes all respondents from campaign villages. Column (2) includes only
brochure recipients. Column (3) includes controls from campaign villages. Column (4) includes
households from control villages. Columns (5) and (6) present p-values of t-test
comparing brochure recipients with the two control groups, respectively.
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-
Table 2.10:
Linear Regression - Brochure Impact and Spill-over Effect on Knowledge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: Full Sample
Brochure received 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10)
Spill-over -0.26** -0.22* -0.16 -0.26* -0.22 -0.16
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12)
Observations 2571 2550 2532 2571 2550 2532
PANEL B: Female Sample
Brochure received -0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.00 0.04 0.05
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12)
Spill-over -0.34** -0.29** -0.19 -0.34* -0.29* -0.19
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14)
Observations 1894 1884 1867 1894 1884 1867
Control variables no yes yes no yes yes
Additional control variables no no yes no no yes
Robust standard errors yes yes yes no no no
Std. errors clustered at the
barangay level no no no yes yes yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
a. Dependent variable is Literacy Index, i.e. the sum of correct insurance literacy questions at follow-up
(excluding ambiguous questions).
b. Regressions with control variables control for gender of respondent, age and schooling of head, number of children,
type of income source.
c. Additional control variables are shock history, ownership of motorcycle/car and population level of barangay.
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Table 2.11:
Linear Regression - Brochure Impact and Spill-over Effect on Knowledge
(including ambiguous questions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: Full Sample
Brochure received -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10)
Spill-over -0.29** -0.26* -0.19 -0.29** -0.26* -0.19
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Observations 2547 2526 2508 2547 2526 2508
PANEL B: Female Sample
Brochure -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.13)
Spill-over -0.35** -0.31** -0.20 -0.35** -0.31* -0.20
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)
Observations 1873 1863 1846 1873 1863 1846
Control variables no yes yes no yes yes
Additional control variables no no yes no no yes
Robust standard errors yes yes yes no no no
Std. errors clustered at the
barangay level no no no yes yes yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
a. Dependent variable is Literacy Index, i.e. the sum of correct insurance literacy questions at follow-up
(excluding ambiguous questions).
b. Regressions with control variables control for gender of respondent, age and schooling of head, number of children,
type of income source.
c. Additional control variables are shock history, ownership of motorcycle/car and population level of barangay.
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Table 2.17:
Factor-loadings for ”Insurance in General”-items (original and modified
loadings)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
positive 0.07 0.62 -0.15 0 0.59 0
rich -0.38 0.53 -0.03 0 0.60 0
fair 0.61 -0.01 0.08 0.58 0 0
reliable 0.73 0.07 -0.03 0.67 0 0
necessary 0.63 0.21 -0.03 0.63 0 0
affordable -0.07 0.19 0.79 0 0 0.79
cheap 0.23 -0.22 0.76 0 0 0.62
valuable 0.37 0.55 -0.11 0 0.44 0
simple 0.08 0.53 0.29 0 0.42 0
powerful 0.15 0.59 0.16 0 0.49 0
safe 0.67 -0.01 0.23 0.67 0 0
beneficial 0.66 0.05 0.13 0.65 0 0
Table 2.18:
Factor-loadings for ”Buying Health Insurance” (original and modified
loadings)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2
easy 0.19 0.53 0 0.62
close 0.01 0.77 0 0.76
good 0.79 0.05 0.77 0
wise 0.69 0.00 0.65 0
useful 0.77 0.07 0.76 0
54
Table 2.19:
Linear Regression - Dependent Variable modified Factors for Insurance
in general
Insurance in General Buying Health Insurance
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2
Brochure received 0.14 0.04 -0.13** 0.35** -0.13**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.16) (0.06)
Spill-over 0.22** 0.08 -0.21*** 0.37** -0.15**
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.16) (0.07)
Observations 2469 2469 2469 2514 2514
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the barangay level.
OLS with modified factors as dependent variables
For ”Insurance in General” Factor 1 captures fair - reliable - necessary - safe - beneficial
Factor 2 captures positive - rich - valuable - simple - powerful
Factor 3 captures affordable - cheap
For ”Buying Health Insurance” Factor 1 captures good - wise - useful
Factor 2 captures easy - close
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Table 2.21:
Linear Regression - Impact of Brochure and Spill-over on Attitude-Items
for Buying Health Insurance
Factor 1: Worthiness Factor 2: Accessibility
good wise useful easy close
Brochure received 0.18* 0.24** 0.17** -0.04 -0.18**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
Spill-over 0.19* 0.37*** 0.13 -0.17 -0.10
(0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09)
Observations 2542 2531 2534 2542 2541
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the barangay level.
All regressions control for gender of respondent,
age and schooling of head, number of children, type of income source.
Table 2.22: Take-up of PhilHealth Insurance in Experimental Villages
Campaign villages Interview villages Control villages
Total 353 280 755
IPP 211 166 391
SP 142 114 256
Number bgy 34 26 197
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Figure 2.4: Cover Design - Protection Figure 2.5: Cover Design: Trust
Figure 2.6: Cover Design - Optimism Figure 2.7: Cover Design: Solidarity
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Figure 2.8: Questionnaire Items - Knowledge
4.1? Do you have any idea how an insurance works? 
 1 – not at all  2 – a bit  3 – Yes  98 – refuses to answer 99 – does not know 
 
Read: I will ask you some questions to check your level of familiarity with insurances.. Please, tell me if this is true or false. 
 
4.2. If you have an insurance it is free of any fees or payments for you.   
 0 – False  1 – True  98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
 
4.2.2 If  you have an insurance you do not have to pay regularly, you can just pay when you want. 
 0 – False  1 – True  98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
 
4.2.3 If you have an insurance and you are late with your payments or do not pay,  the insurance does not help you when you 
have a problem.  
 0 – False  1 – True  98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
 
4.2.4 If you have an insurance, you need to contact your insurer if something happens that is covered by the insurance. 
 0 – False  1 – True  98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
 
4.2.5 If you pay regularly to that insurance and you never need to use it, you get your money back. 
 0 – False  1 – True  98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
 
4.2.6. PhilHealth membership-cards are accepted in every hospital. 
 0 – False  1 – True  98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
 
4.2.7 PhilHealth covers all inpatient and  outpatient services. 
 0 – False  1 – True  98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
 
Read: In your opinion, if you have an insurance you pay... 
 1 –...only once when you make the contract 
 2 –...regularly every month,  every 3 months once a year 
 3 –...only when I have a problem that is covered by the insurance. 
    98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
4.3.2 What is a claim? 
 1 –The contract with an insurance. 
 2 – The regular payment an insured person makes to the insurance company 
 3 The formal way to get money from the insurer for an insured event.  
    98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
4.3. What is an insurance premium? 
 1 –The interest rate you will get for my payments.  
 2 –The regular payment an insured person makes to the insurance company  
 3 –Person who sells insurance  
    98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
 
 
 
4.4.1  Imagine a man wants to protect his family against his death, can he buy an insurance that gives  money to his family 
after his death? 
  0 – no  1 – yes    98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
 
 
4.4.2 Farmers in the Philippines often run the risk that a typhoon destroys their crops. What is in your opinion the best way 
to deal with that? 
 1 – Making donation to church. 
 2 – Saving money for the case that his field is destroyed. 
 3 – Buying a crop insurance, which means signing a contract and regularly paying premium. 
    98 – refuses to answer  99 – does not know 
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Figure 2.9: Questionnaire Items - Attitude
1 
We are trying to find out how you feel about insurance. Please tell us how you feel and rate your feelings 
toward Insurance. There are no wrong or correct answers. Just let us know your first impression.  
As an example rate the word TAIPHOON: strong – weak  ,  good – bad, slow – fast    
 
3.11. How do you feel towards insurance in general: 
1 Positive quite positive Neutral quite negative Negative 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
2 Rich quite rich Neutral quite poor Poor 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
3 Unfair quite unfair Neutral quite fair Fair 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
4 Unreliable quite unreliable Neutral quite reliable Reliable 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
5 Necessary quite necessary Neutral quite unnecessary Unnecessary 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
6 Affordable quite affordable Neutral quite unaffordable Unaffordable 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
7 Expensive quite expensive Neutral quite cheap Cheap 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
8 Valuable quite valuable Neutral quite worthless Worthless 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
9 Simple quite simple Neutral quite complicated Complicated 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
10 Powerful quite powerful Neutral quite powerless Powerless 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
11 Risky quite risky Neutral quite save save 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
12 Wasteful quite wasteful Neutral quite beneficial Beneficial 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
3.12. How do you feel towards buying health insurance: 
 
1 Difficult quite difficult Neutral quite easy Easy 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
2 Close quite close Neutral quite far Far 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
3 Bad quite bad Neutral quite good Good 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
4 Foolish quite foolish Neutral quite wise Wise 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
5 Useless quite useless Neutral quite useful Useful 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
7 Healthy quite healthy Neutral quite sick Sick 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 
CHAPTER III
Strengthening Rural Producer Organizations in
Uganda: The impact on household labor decisions
3.1 Introduction
In rural Sub-Saharan Africa, producer organizations (PO) promise improved mar-
ket access for smallholder farmers. It is under the rationale that collective action
offsets problems related to diseconomies of scale that farmers join in marketing and
other activities (Heyer et al., 1999; Hill et al., 2008; The World Bank, 2008). This
way of eradicating market imperfections that the individual farmers encounter aims
at improving outcomes, most importantly, at cutting costs and increasing profits.
Less clear is the effect that producer organizations (POs) have on the allocation of
inputs. Market imperfections are likely to cause inefficient use of production factors.
It is at the heart of this study to test whether POs affect the most flexible input
factor that smallholder farmers possess: labor.
Generally, POs are member driven organizations. Their success depends on the
members’ participation in joint activities. But despite the potential benefits of col-
lective action, reality shows that member participation is low and farmers continue
to engage in markets individually (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005; Hill, 2010). Two issues
can, at least partly, be blamed for the members’ reluctance to avail of the services
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offered by their PO, leading them to accept the adverse market conditions they are
facing when making individual sales. Firstly, farmers struggle with cash constraints
that render participation in PO marketing activities uninteresting as they cause sub-
stantial delays in payment as compared to sales to itinerant traders. Secondly, the
POs sales processes are not transparent for farmers. This creates distrust towards
the organization and its leaders or the representatives of the umbrella organizations.
Farmers fear that they will not be paid at all, or that the increases in prices that
occur through bulking will not be shared completely.
Given these frictions PO members do not consider participation a valuable op-
tion to improve their market situation. Non-participation in the joint activities and
continued inefficiencies are the consequence. These inefficiencies are likely to affect
also labor allocation (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999).
The study at hand tries to assess whether addressing the above mentioned weak-
nesses of POs effectively changes the allocation of labor. This is based on the as-
sumption that improved market access affects input allocation (Sadoulet et al., 1998),
a hypotheses that remains to be verified experimentally. Schmitz and Nadvi (1999)
point out that rendering markets accessible can result in the mobilization of untapped
labor resources - a necessity for the development process. To test this assumption,
we use a randomized controlled trial in Uganda to assesses how changes in the pro-
cedures of the PO affect the labor input decisions of their members. We randomly
allocate three different alterations in the PO procedures to a set of 167 POs.
The first alteration tackles the problem of delayed payments concurrent to bulk-
ing activities. It effectively reduces the period of time that PO members have to
wait before receiving the revenue from sales through the PO. By reducing the post-
ponement in payment, inefficiencies for cash constrained farmers are reduced. This
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could affect the demand for hired labor as it increases the capacity to pay laborers
immediately after harvesting. Adams (1991) stresses the importance of smallholder
agriculture for the demand of agricultural wage labour for the case of Zimbabwe.
Other than in developed countries, in rural African labour markets daily payment
or payment on piece/task basis is prevalent for rural laborers. Sender (2005) studies
the labour market in Mozambique and reports that 70 percent of agricultural wage
laborers receive either daily pay or are paid by the piece delivered or task accom-
plished. Under such conditions and under the assumption that a credit constraint
exists, smallholder farmers with cash constraints are unattractive employers. Natu-
rally, laborers prefer to offer their labor to smallholder farmers who do not engage in
bulking and who remunerate without postponement. Simultaneously PO members
might refrain from hiring additional labor due to their inherent incapacity to pay
wages promptly after harvesting.
The second intervention tackles the problem of opaque sales procedures. Ordinary
PO members are not present at the time of the final sale of their bulked produce.
Hence, their engagement in joint marketing requires trust in the PO in general and in
its leaders more specifically. If trust is low the inclination to participate is low, too.
By providing information on the final sale this intervention tries to offset the lack
of trust. In a first step, a voucher system is put in place to document the quantity
a farmer delivers to the PO. To reinforce voucher distribution, financial incentives
are given to those who issue the vouchers. In a second step, external consultants
are present when the PO leaders make the final sale. These consultants inform the
smallholder farmers via sms text messages about the details of the sale.
Both intervention can also have an effect on household labor input. Through
participation in the bulking bargaining power increases which optimally results in
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higher sales prices and the expectation of increased prices might affect labor input
decisions.
We observe that PO members in Uganda adapt their household labor allocation
and their demand for hired labor in the advent of these interventions. Mere anticipa-
tion of changes that promise better market participation through the PO suffices to
induce these effects. Furthermore, the distinct treatment arms prove to have differ-
ential effects on the type of labor that is mobilized. Information on sales procedures
rather increases the amount of household labor, while relieving cash constraints at
harvest increases the labor hired for crop production. This work adds to the stock of
knowledge on rural POs, by assessing the effects on labor allocation, and by assessing
the role trust plays for this.
3.2 Context and the Interventions
3.2.1 Labor Market Context
Uganda’s population has increased from around 9 million in the 1969 to an esti-
mated 34 million today1. Close to 90 percent of the population reside in rural areas.
Naturally, the extent of population growth poses stress for food security and employ-
ment. Official estimations show that 66 percent of the labor force make a living in
agriculture (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2010) 2. In rural areas the share of people
aged 15-60 who work in agriculture is above 70 percent. As in many African coun-
tries, Uganda’s agriculture relies heavily on smallholder farming. Due to unfavorable
market structures smallholders seek refuge in the formation of POs to improve their
market situation.
1See http://countrystat.org/home.aspx?c=UGA&tr=12
2 See http:\www.ubos.org
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Heyer et al. (1999) point out that such group formation tackles market imper-
fections by performing efficiency functions. These are the main drivers for farmers
to engage in collective action as the group activity promises to improve their situa-
tion vis-a-vis adverse market conditions, e.g. high transaction costs and information
asymmetries.
The World Development Report 2008 (The World Bank, 2008) recognizes the
linkages between improved market access for smallholder farmers and increased em-
ployment in agriculture. It emphasizes further the role for poverty reduction in rural
areas through increased employment opportunities. A rigorous assessment of such
claims needs to be provided yet.
3.2.2 Producer Organization Context
Develtere et al. (2008) explain the history of producer organizations in Uganda
that started as early as 1913. Later, after independence in 1962 the Ugandan govern-
ment heavily regulated the market for agricultural outputs and organized marketing
boards. Such boards set constant buying prices independently of the time of the
season, liberating the farmer of the question when to sell (Ponte, 2002; Shepherd,
2011). The question to whom to sell was equally redundant at that time, since pro-
ducer organizations were the only marketing option for small holders (Hill et al.,
2008; Ponte, 2002).
With liberalization starting in the 1990s the POs saw change internally as well as
in their environment. Under the structural adjustment programs liberalization in the
coffee market was promoted and with the introduction of competitive market struc-
tures the cooperatives nearly disappeared (Ponte, 2002). Develtere et al. (2008, p.
156) document that many POs collapsed due to ”...massive corruption, mismanage-
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ment, theft, failure to hold elections, failure to surrender members’ deposits, failure
to hold elections on time, favoritism and dismissal of staff, refusal of officials to va-
cate office after being duly voted out...”. Against this historical background, the role
of trust in producer organization gains in relevance.
3.2.3 Interventions
We designed two interventions to tackle barriers that keep PO members from
participating in the bulk sales: partial payment at the harvest delivery and increase
in transparency of the sales process. We are not aware of previous evidence in the
literature documenting the effectiveness of these measures on labor allocation.
Cash on Delivery
This intervention provides randomly selected POs with the financial means to
pay members a share of their revenue right when the farmer delivers the harvest to
the PO. The intervention started by distributing vouchers to PO members. Holding
such a voucher qualified the farmer to receive 30 percent of the total sales price right
at delivery. The remaining 70 percent of the sales price were to be paid out after the
PO made the final sale.
Information on Sales
POs randomly allocated to receive this intervention set up a voucher system
that documents the quantities a farmer delivered to the PO. At delivery the farmer
and the PO representative would fill out a slip stating the quantity that the farmer
delivered. The PO representatives were given financial incentives to distribute these
vouchers. All PO members were informed about this documentation system and
about the incentive system for the representatives.
75
In addition to installing and reinforcing the voucher system, an external consul-
tant was hired that provided the ordinary members with information on the final
sale. The ordinary members elected two of them who would receive a text message
from the consultant right after the final sale. The text message stated the final quan-
tity and the price per kilogram. The two elected members received training on how
to interpret and explain the text message. The regular members received training
on how to interpret the information from that text message.
Both interventions
In POs selected for both interventions the members received training on using
the cash-on-delivery vouchers, the delivery slips and in interpreting the information-
on-sales text messages.
3.3 Experimental Design and Data Collection
For the experiment we applied a cluster randomized trial where the unit of ran-
domization is the PO and the unit of analysis is the individual PO member. From
our sample of 167 POs 42 were selected to receive the cash-on-delivery interven-
tion only, 42 were selected to receive the information-on-sales intervention only, 40
POs were allocated to receive both the cash-on-delivery and the information-on-sales
interventions, and 43 were allocated to the control group.
The organizational structure these member driven organizations is such that on
the district level POs are grouped in depot committees (DC). The DCs process and
sell the crop3. Affiliation with a DC could potentially lead to imbalances in various
3The next highest level above the DC is the service organization. Each DC in our sample is mem-
ber in one of the following five service organizations: the National Union of Coffee Agribusinesses
and Farm Enterprises (NUCAFE), NKG Coffee Alliance Trust, Volunteer Effort for Development
Concerns (VEDCO), the Uganda Co-operative Alliance (UCA) and Kulika.
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observable and unobservable ways. To avoid such imbalances we stratified our sample
of POs by DC. Stratification on the basis of variables that are likely to influence main
outcomes also increases the power of the statistical analyzes (Bruhn and McKenzie,
2009). We stratified the POs according to DC affiliation into ten strata. The number
of POs per DC/strata varies substantially with the smallest DC contributing seven
and the largest one 30 POs. Furthermore, the smallest DC is exceptional as it does
not have a PO allocated to receive the cash-on-delivery treatment only.
We conducted a baseline and an endline household survey, and interviewed at
least two members of each PO, amounting to around 80 respondents per group. The
interventions were implemented between November 2010 and September 2011. The
endline data was collected in October 2011. For the analysis, we dropped three
households from this sample because they had extreme values on a few characteris-
tics4.
3.3.1 Baseline Information by Treatment Status
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics at baseline for the sample by treatment
status. The last columns list the p-value from t-tests to indicate whether any ob-
served difference in means between the treatment group and the control group is
statistically significant. Despite the randomization into treatment we find a handful
of variables that are significantly different at the ten per cent level. At baseline,
the PO members in our sample have around 7 household members, the head is on
average roughly 50 years old, the spouse is about ten years younger, and in only 11
to 15 percent of the cases, depending on the group, is the head of the household
4One of the dropped households has 25,000 coffee trees as compared to the average in the sample
of 660. The other two were remotely distant from the next producer market with over 45km as
compared to the average distance of five km.
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a woman. The average schooling of the household head lies between six and seven
years and is lowest in the control group.
The only variable that we find to be significantly different at the five percent level
is the number of parcels, with 2.5 parcels in the control group and 2.1 in the group
that received both interventions. Roughly 50 percent of the treatment sample plants
coffee, whereby only 43 percent of the control group do so. Yet, this difference is not
significant. Around 34 to 39 percent of the farmers have more than 500 coffee plants.
The share of members living more than five km away from the next agricultural
market is around 30 per cent in the CoD group and in the group that received
both interventions, but only for the former is the difference with the control group
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In the control group we find that 45
percent of the respondents live less than five km from the next market.
Availability of electricity in the household is low at 6 to 11 percent, compared
to ownership of a mobile telephone which is at roughly 60 per cent. Ownership of
savings accounts is at around 23 to 36 percent and about 33 to 41 per cent of the
respondents hold informal savings. Trust is relatively high given that 75 percent
trust their neighbor and over 50 per cent trust people in general. We create a proxy
variable to measure trust in PO leaders which reveal quite high confidence in the
leaders.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Mean Comparison of Outcome Variables by Treatment Status
We present in tables 3.2 and 3.3 summary statistics of the four response vari-
ables that measure labor input: household member labor days in farming activities,
household member labor days in crop production, hired labor days used on farm,
and hired labor days for crop production. Table 3.2 presents the results for the first
agricultural season, and table 3.3 those for the second season. We compute t-tests
at baseline and at the endline and present the p-values in the last three columns.
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At baseline all outcomes are balanced, i.e. we do not find any significant difference
neither in the first nor the second season between the means of the control group and
the groups that received an intervention. For the first season, we find some evidence
for impact as differences at the 10 per cent level exist at endline between the mean
of the control group and that of the group that received information on sales. This
is the case for household member labor days in farming activities, and for household
member labor days in crop production. For the second season, we find evidence of a
significant difference at the endline for the variable household member labor days in
crop production for the group that received both interventions.
3.4.2 Estimation Strategy
Given that a few significant differences exist between the treated and the control
group at baseline we complement the simple means comparison by OLS estimations.
This allows controlling for the unbalanced items. We evaluate the impact of being
a member in a PO that received one of the three interventions on our outcome
variables: household member labor days in farming activities, household member
labor days in crop production, hired labor days used on farm, and hired labor days
for crop production, by estimating the following equation for member i :
(3.1) Yi = α + βCoDi + γIoSi + δBothi + ηXi +
10∑
s=1
λsDCi,s + i
where CoDi is an indicator variable taking on value one if member i is from a
PO that was assigned to distribute vouchers for cash-on-delivery, IoSi is an indicator
variable taking on value one if member i is from a PO where information-on-sales
were distributed, and Bothi is an indicator variable that denotes affiliation of member
i to a PO that received both interventions at the same time. With coefficient β we
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then estimate the Intention to treat (ITT) effect of the Cash on Delivery treatment,
with γ the ITT effect of the information on sales treatment and with δ the ITT effect
of implementing both interventions at the same time.
The vector Xi contains the control variables household size, years of schooling
of the household head, age of the household head, a dummy for female household
heads, a dummy for land size is larger than seven acres, the number of parcels, a
dummy for farmer plants coffee, a dummy for number of coffee trees is above 500,
a dummy for savings at a bank, a dummy for household has a mobile phone, a
dummy for household has electricity, a dummy for distance to next producer market
is larger than 5 kms and a dummy capturing whether the neighbors can be trusted.
All control variables where measured at baseline. The matrix Xi is only included
when specifically mentioned. The DC indicators on which we stratified the random
allocation of the treatments enter our estimation via DCi,s, where s is the DC.
We restrict our estimations to the ITT effect which gives us the average impact
of offering the intervention on the PO level, regardless of whether the individual
ultimately participates in joint marketing or not. The ITT effect is the relevant
effect here since it is offering the treatment that affects the labor input decisions
which are taken way before the final decision to join in the bulking of the PO. In
other words, the sequencing is such that the labor decisions are affected by offering
the intervention even if the member does not take them up in the end.
In addition, we estimate regressions where we control also for the initial value of
the outcome variable. As proposed by (McKenzie, 2012) this specification increases
statistical power when autocorrelation of the outcome variable is low:
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(3.2) Yi1 = α + βCoDi + γIoSi + δBothi + χYi0 +
10∑
s=1
λsDCi,s + i
where Yit captures the outcome at t = 0, 1, i.e. baseline or endline. The period
of observation covers two agricultural seasons. We are explicitly interested in the
distinct effects of the interventions on labor input for these two seasons. Therefore,
we estimate all regressions separately for the first season - where labor decisions are
taken without any experience about how the intervention changes access to markets
- and the second season where members have some experience with the intervention.
We estimate all regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Sec-
ondly, we re-run the regressions and correct the standard errors through clustering
on the PO level. The latter strategy takes into account that the regressors of inter-
est, i.e. the treatment indicators, do not vary on the individual but only on the PO
level. We cannot rule out that intraclass correlation is potentially high within the
PO and when using robust standard errors its presence might lead us to overestimate
the precision of our coefficients (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The estimation results
based on clustered standard errors are presented in Appendix A. Comparison with
the robust estimations shows that the standard errors increase. Yet the significance
of most results is robust to clustering.
3.4.3 Average Impacts on Household Labor Inputs
Table 3.4 presents coefficients from estimation of Equation 3.1 in Columns (1)
and (2) and of Equation 3.2 in Column (3). The outcome variable is the number
of household member labor days in farming activities. The left panel presents the
coefficients estimated for that particular labor input in the first seasons, the right
panel presents them for the second season. In the first season, the control group
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reports having spent around 195 days in farming (see Table 3.2). Here, only assign-
ment to the IoS treatment shows a significant effect, reflecting that the members in
IoS POs increased the number of labor days their household spends farming by at
least 54.4 days. Not only is this statistically significant, also from an economic point
of view does the size play a significant role as on average every household member
spends over one week more (54.4/7 = 7.8) in farming activities. When controlling
for individual characteristics the effect is significant at the 5 per cent level. In the
second season the estimated impacts of IoS are lower in size, ranging only from 43.4
to 55.7, and are no longer significant across all three specifications. The reduction
in effect size could be explained by an unsatisfied experience made with the inter-
vention during the first season. But this cannot be tested here. CoD has very low
and insignificant effects ranging from 1 to 15.1 days in the first season. In the second
season these effects are larger but remain insignificant.
Table 3.5 then looks at household labor days spent in crop production. Columns
1 through 3 of the middle panel show again that it is only assignment to the IoS
group that has significant and sizable effects on the days the household spends on
this activity in the first season. Again, these effects do not carry over to the second
agricultural season. Yet, for household member days in crop production we observe
large and significant effects from assignment to Both, i.e. the mix of both inter-
ventions. In this treatment group members increase input to this activity at least
48.6 days. These effects are significant at the 5 per cent level when estimated with
individual level covariates and when we control for the initial value of the dependent
variable. One could argue that the high increase in effect size from the first to the
second season is a result from positive experience made during the first season. As
for the earlier case, this cannot be tested here.
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Table 3.4: OLS - Impact on Household Member Labor Days in Farming Activities
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD -3.2 13.6 -5.0 28.1 47.0 35.5
(29.8) (28.7) (29.8) (33.5) (33.8) (33.3)
IoS 47.1 63.8** 47.2 44.7 61.7* 46.4
(32.6) (31.8) (32.3) (33.9) (34.0) (33.4)
both 5.0 27.4 5.0 62.4 86.3** 67.0*
(29.7) (30.0) (29.2) (40.1) (41.8) (38.8)
Observations 317 311 317 316 310 316
R2 0.061 0.148 0.072 0.112 0.194 0.157
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.074 0.032 0.077 0.123 0.121
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.5: OLS - Impact on Household Member Labor Days in Crop Production
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 2.9 5.1 3.3 16.7 21.5 16.0
(14.4) (14.9) (14.4) (18.3) (19.3) (18.5)
IoS 25.2* 27.2* 26.1* 33.1 35.0 36.1
(14.7) (14.9) (14.8) (21.7) (23.1) (21.9)
both 8.4 16.2 7.3 52.1** 59.5** 53.7**
(13.4) (14.3) (13.4) (23.9) (25.7) (23.8)
Observations 317 311 315 316 310 315
R2 0.113 0.198 0.118 0.145 0.213 0.156
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.128 0.080 0.111 0.144 0.119
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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3.4.4 Average Impacts on Hired Labor Inputs
A key question is not only whether households adapt their own labor input in
anticipation of better market access but whether their demand for external labor is
also affected. Table 3.6 examines the impact of assignment to one of the treatment
groups on labor hired for farming activities. We see that there is no significant
impact. The lack of an effect here might, in part, be explained by the fact that all
four groups increase hired labor substantially from baseline to endline. The mean
for the control group is at around 50 days in both of the two seasons which is about
20 days higher than at baseline (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Section 3.4.1). For the
other groups we even observe increases by 30 days. Given that we observe already
significant increases in household labor for this activity, at least for the IoS group,
one could also assume that this crowds out the need for hired labor.
In Table 3.7 we see the estimates for the impact on hired labor for crop production.
Here the mean of the control group in the first season is 42 days (Table 3.2) and 58
days for the second season (Table 3.3). The OLS estimates of Equation 3.1 are all
insignificant. For the first season the estimates of Equation 3.2, controlling for the
initial value of the outcome, result in an impact of 36.8 days with significance at
the 10 per cent level for the CoD and 50.5 days for the IoS treatment at 5 per cent
significance. However, these estimates need to be considered apart as the number of
observations is relatively low. This results from the fact that only 124 individuals
hire laborers in both, the first and in the second season.
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Table 3.6: OLS - Impact on Hired Labor Fays in Farming Activities
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 18.8 22.2 16.3 16.0 17.2 13.8
(19.9) (21.0) (19.7) (22.5) (23.7) (22.4)
IoS 20.7 20.8 11.8 6.1 4.8 -1.0
(16.3) (15.3) (15.0) (16.6) (16.5) (16.0)
both -8.9 3.4 -7.1 12.2 26.0 12.5
(15.4) (17.4) (14.4) (27.5) (29.7) (27.2)
Observations 317 311 316 317 311 316
R2 0.037 0.092 0.123 0.052 0.091 0.084
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.013 0.085 0.015 0.011 0.045
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.7: OLS - Impact on Hired Labor Days in Crop Production
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 24.2 25.1 36.8* 35.6 31.3 53.7
(17.5) (18.9) (21.5) (29.4) (32.2) (41.4)
IoS 12.3 15.2 50.5** 8.9 10.6 34.9
(14.7) (13.5) (19.7) (20.7) (20.7) (24.1)
both 15.7 32.4 42.0 44.3 60.1 28.0
(21.5) (24.4) (26.9) (47.1) (47.3) (27.1)
Observations 185 183 124 181 179 117
R2 0.040 0.123 0.177 0.106 0.133 0.134
Adjusted R2 -0.027 -0.016 0.080 0.042 -0.009 0.024
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
91
3.4.5 Heterogeneity of Impacts
Naturally, trust plays an important role in the member’s decision to adjust labor
input as a result of the anticipated changes from the interventions. This is especially
relevant, in the first season there is no experience on how these changes will be imple-
mented. We therefore examine whether the effects of assignment to treatment differ
for those members that have trust in their PO leaders at baseline. A question asking
directly whether the respondent trusts the PO leaders risks to suffer from courtesy
bias, i.e. the respondent gives socially desirable answers. Instead, we elicit the re-
spondent’s opinion of the PO leaders indirectly. At baseline, the respondents rated
the effort that, in their opinion, the PO leaders would exert for a communal project
5. This rating reflects to what degree the respondent esteems the PO leaders. We
assume that this correlates with the level of trust in the PO leaders. We normalized
this rating by the effort that the respondent expects from ordinary members and
created a dummy variable taking on value one whenever the respondent thinks the
PO leaders would put more effort into the project than the ordinary members. The
following regressions include only the subsample of PO members who trust their PO
leaders according to this variable.
Table 3.8 presents the effect on household member days in farming activities. As
compared to the full sample the subgroup analysis shows similar results for the first
season: Only assignment to IoS causes significant increases in the number of days
the households spends on farming. The size of the effects is at around 70 days which
is roughly 15 days higher than for the full sample. Interestingly, for the trustful
sample we also detect significant effects of similar size for IoS assignment in the sec-
5At endline we ask directly whether the PO leaders can be trusted despite the risk of courtesy
bias.
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ond season. For the members assigned to receive both interventions simultaneously
we obtain a negative but insignificant effect in the first season. CoD members only
increase their household farming days insignificantly in the first season. For the sec-
ond season, we estimate a significant impact of 62.2 days if we control for individual
characteristics.
In Table 3.9 we find a similar pattern for crop production. The impact of IoS
assignment that we observe to be significant in the full sample is stronger here in
terms of magnitude and significance and it also remains significant in the second
season. While the IoS treatment is propelled by trust in the PO leaders, assignment
to CoD and Both does not lead to heterogeneous effects. On the contrary, assignment
to Both has significant effects on the full sample but not on the subsample. The
estimates of the impact on hiring labor for farming are all larger in absolute size.
Striking is the large negative impact that assignment to Both causes in the first
season. It is counter intuitive that the implementation of both interventions leads
members to reduce their demand for hired labor, and even more so for those who
have trust in their leaders. The significance of the effect is not robust across seasons
or specifications, yet the sign remains negative.
The regression results presented in Table 3.11 capture the ITT effect on labor
hired for crop production for the subsample of members that trust their PO leaders.
We see that in the first season assignment to CoD increases hired labor input by 34.3
days and more, depending on the specification. These effects are substantially higher
as compared to the estimates on the entire sample and they are also significant at
the 5 per cent level. This indicates that the outlook to be eligible to receive cash
on delivery has had stronger effects on those members that state at baseline to trust
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their PO leaders. For the second season, we document even higher effects of over
40.5 days but these impact estimates are insignificant.
Table 3.8:
Impact on Household Member Labor Days in Farming Activities (Sample
of Respondents that Trust their PO Leaders)
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 7.8 24.9 5.9 41.4 59.6 48.6
(34.1) (31.6) (34.0) (38.6) (38.1) (38.0)
IoS 63.8* 78.2** 64.2* 59.3 75.8** 61.8*
(36.0) (34.9) (35.7) (37.4) (37.2) (36.6)
both -19.9 4.7 -18.9 35.3 64.8 44.1
(32.0) (30.6) (31.7) (45.9) (48.7) (45.4)
Observations 265 260 265 264 259 264
R2 0.076 0.179 0.085 0.085 0.181 0.128
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.091 0.038 0.041 0.093 0.083
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
3.4.6 Average Impacts on Trust in Leaders
The previous section provided evidence that heterogeneity in the impact exist
according to whether the member has trust in PO leaders or not. It is trust at
baseline that creates this heterogeneity. Since we measure trust at endline as well,
we can test whether any of the interventions affected it.
Table 3.12 documents the descriptive results for three different trust measures
observed at endline. The respondents rated whether most people can be trusted,
whether in their absence neighbors could be trusted to look after their house and
whether PO leaders could be trusted to make decisions that are good for the PO
members. All three original variables are scaled from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Based on this we created indicator variables taking on value one
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Table 3.9:
Impact on Household Member Labor Days in Crop Production (Sample
of Household that Trust their PO Leaders)
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 9.8 10.7 10.5 28.2 31.4 27.2
(17.0) (17.3) (17.0) (21.1) (21.9) (21.2)
IoS 36.0** 36.2** 37.5** 47.7** 47.6* 49.8**
(16.6) (16.8) (16.8) (24.1) (25.4) (24.2)
both -0.8 6.9 -2.8 40.6 46.5 42.6
(14.4) (15.1) (14.4) (26.5) (28.9) (26.6)
Observations 265 260 264 264 259 264
R2 0.105 0.202 0.113 0.106 0.191 0.113
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.117 0.067 0.063 0.104 0.067
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.10:
Impact on Hired Labor Days in Farming Activities (Sample of Respon-
dents that Trust their PO Leaders)
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 34.5 35.4 32.0 36.3 35.7 33.4
(21.9) (22.4) (21.5) (24.2) (24.3) (23.9)
IoS 35.9** 31.7* 25.3 24.0 18.2 15.7
(17.6) (16.8) (15.8) (15.5) (15.2) (14.7)
both -19.0* -9.0 -13.9 -11.2 -0.3 -8.6
(11.2) (11.7) (11.4) (12.3) (13.9) (12.0)
Observations 266 261 265 266 261 265
R2 0.066 0.142 0.109 0.062 0.135 0.097
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.051 0.063 0.018 0.043 0.050
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.11:
Impact on Labor Days of Hired Labor for Crop Production (Sample of
Respondents that Trust their PO Leaders)
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 36.4** 38.8** 44.5* 52.3 51.7 72.2
(18.4) (19.5) (23.8) (31.6) (34.7) (48.0)
IoS 26.2* 25.4* 59.8*** 21.8 20.9 51.9*
(15.6) (13.4) (22.4) (19.1) (17.6) (27.5)
both -9.3 0.6 7.7 3.3 18.2 22.9
(10.1) (11.7) (13.2) (18.8) (22.6) (28.1)
Observations 156 154 105 152 151 100
R2 0.079 0.237 0.130 0.115 0.194 0.139
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.089 0.005 0.038 0.033 0.009
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
whenever an answer greater than 4 (neither agree nor disagree) was given. We present
the mean level of trust for the respective group in the middle panel and p-values from
t-tests comparing the means for the different treatment groups to the control group
in the last panel. None of the trust indicators shows a significant difference. This
indicates that trust as we measure it was not affected by any of the interventions.
Trust in PO leaders is very high at over 80 percent in all groups. While this
variable was proxied at baseline (see Section 3.3.1), at endline we asked directly
whether the PO leaders can be trusted. This could in part explain the higher average
outcome at endline as compared to the baseline (compare Table 3.1). If one assumes
that trust is constant over time, the difference between the proxy measure at baseline
and the direct measure at endline could be interpreted as a naive estimate of the
courtesy bias, i.e. the interview situation causes the respondent to rate the trust in
PO leaders higher than she would rate it under other circumstances.
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We assess the impact on trust equally by estimating equation 3.1 with and without
individual level covariates. The question on trust in PO leaders differs between
baseline and endline so that we are not able to estimate Equation 3.2. The coefficient
estimates are presented in Table 3.13. We find no evidence for a positive effect on
trust from any of the interventions. Our impact estimates are fairly small in size,
amounting at most to 3 per cent, and are all statistically insignificant. This confirms
the descriptive picture that trust in the PO leaders, as we measure it, was not affected
by the intervention.
Table 3.13: OLS - Impact on Trust in PO Leaders
(1) (2)
CoD 0.03 0.03
(0.1) (0.1)
IoS 0.02 0.02
(0.1) (0.1)
both -0.03 -0.02
(0.1) (0.1)
Observations 319 313
R2 0.048 0.066
Adjusted R2 0.011 -0.016
Individual level covariates no yes
Initial value of Y as covariate no no
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specification (3)
not estimated as variable was not measured at baseline.
All estimations control for stratification on the DC level.
3.5 Conclusion
Our results provide further evidence for the relevance of collective action for rural
development. We have shown that interventions aiming at improved market access
through producer organizations in rural Africa can substantially affect the labor
input decisions of the PO members. The results support the assumption that lack
of market accesss creates disincentives for labor input in smallholder agriculture,
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which potentially hampers development. We observe that tackling the imperfections
that block market access can unleash labor resources. Sadoulet et al. (1998) describe
three different labor regimes in agricultural economies: wage laborers, farmers relying
solely on household labor and farmers that hire in additional labor. Our results
suggest that the interventions we study can make a difference for all three regimes.
First, the provision of information to increase transparency in the sales procedures
of the PO proved effective in unleashing untapped household labor. Second, we
provide some evidende that the reduction of cash constraints at harvest time allows
for increases in the employment of hired labor.
Especially so for the latter, we document that the effects are stronger when the
level of trust in PO leaders is high. This demonstrates the importance of strong
institutional features that enable the PO to address the members’ needs. One can
assume that members’ trust correlates with institutional strength. We observe fur-
ther evidence for effect heterogeneity as the effects wear off in the full sample after
the first season. The impact persists over time only in the subsample of members
who trust their PO leaders. This gives rise to assess whether the interventions were
effective in changing the members’ trust in their institution. We fail, though, to
provide evidence on this end.
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Appendix
Table 3.14: OLS - Impact on Household Member Labor Days in Farming Activities
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD -3.2 13.6 -5.0 28.1 47.0 35.5
(35.5) (32.4) (35.4) (40.6) (38.0) (39.9)
IoS 47.1 63.8* 47.2 44.7 61.7 46.4
(37.8) (36.3) (37.6) (40.0) (38.6) (39.3)
both 5.0 27.4 5.0 62.4 86.3* 67.0
(30.7) (29.1) (30.4) (47.6) (48.3) (45.6)
Observations 317 311 317 316 310 316
R2 0.061 0.148 0.072 0.112 0.194 0.157
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.074 0.032 0.077 0.123 0.121
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PO-level.
All estimations control for stratification on the DC level.
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Table 3.15: OLS - Impact on Household Member Labor Days in Crop Production
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 2.9 5.1 3.3 16.7 21.5 16.0
(15.1) (14.9) (15.1) (20.8) (20.8) (20.8)
IoS 25.2 27.2* 26.1 33.1 35.0 36.1
(16.5) (16.1) (16.7) (24.9) (25.8) (25.2)
both 8.4 16.2 7.3 52.1* 59.5** 53.7**
(12.9) (13.7) (13.1) (26.9) (28.6) (26.8)
Observations 317 311 315 316 310 315
R2 0.113 0.198 0.118 0.145 0.213 0.156
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.128 0.080 0.111 0.144 0.119
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PO-level.
All estimations control for stratification on the DC level.
Table 3.16: OLS - Impact on Hired labor Days in Farming Activities
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 18.8 22.2 16.3 16.0 17.2 13.8
(22.8) (23.8) (22.4) (25.8) (26.2) (25.7)
IoS 20.7 20.8 11.8 6.1 4.8 -1.0
(18.7) (18.0) (17.6) (19.3) (19.0) (18.9)
both -8.9 3.4 -7.1 12.2 26.0 12.5
(16.2) (18.5) (15.9) (28.2) (30.5) (28.1)
Observations 317 311 316 317 311 316
R2 0.037 0.092 0.123 0.052 0.091 0.084
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.013 0.085 0.015 0.011 0.045
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PO-level.
All estimations control for stratification on the DC level.
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Table 3.17: OLS - Impact on Hired Labor Days in Crop Production
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 24.2 25.1 36.8 35.6 31.3 53.7
(19.0) (19.8) (23.3) (28.8) (30.7) (40.8)
IoS 12.3 15.2 50.5** 8.9 10.6 34.9
(16.4) (14.7) (24.1) (24.0) (23.7) (27.8)
both 15.7 32.4 42.0 44.3 60.1 28.0
(20.1) (22.5) (27.2) (47.2) (47.2) (28.0)
Observations 185 183 124 181 179 117
R2 0.040 0.123 0.177 0.106 0.133 0.134
Adjusted R2 -0.027 -0.016 0.080 0.042 -0.009 0.024
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PO-level.
All estimations control for stratification on the DC level.
Table 3.18:
Impact on Household Member Labor Days in Farming Activities (Sample
of Respondents that Trust their PO Leaders)
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 7.8 24.9 5.9 41.4 59.6 48.6
(40.7) (36.2) (40.6) (46.8) (42.8) (45.2)
IoS 63.8 78.2* 64.2 59.3 75.8* 61.8
(42.3) (40.0) (42.0) (43.9) (41.3) (42.8)
both -19.9 4.7 -18.9 35.3 64.8 44.1
(35.9) (32.3) (35.6) (51.2) (51.7) (50.4)
Observations 265 260 265 264 259 264
R2 0.076 0.179 0.085 0.085 0.181 0.128
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.091 0.038 0.041 0.093 0.083
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PO-level.
All estimations control for stratification on the DC level.
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Table 3.19:
Impact on Household Member Labor Days in Crop Production (Sample
of Respondents that Trust their PO Leaders)
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 9.8 10.7 10.5 28.2 31.4 27.2
(18.0) (17.8) (18.1) (23.8) (23.7) (23.7)
IoS 36.0* 36.2** 37.5** 47.7* 47.6* 49.8*
(18.3) (17.6) (18.7) (27.2) (27.7) (27.2)
both -0.8 6.9 -2.8 40.6 46.5 42.6
(14.9) (14.9) (15.0) (28.9) (30.4) (29.1)
Observations 265 260 264 264 259 264
R2 0.105 0.202 0.113 0.106 0.191 0.113
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.117 0.067 0.063 0.104 0.067
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PO-level.
All estimations control for stratification on the DC level.
Table 3.20:
Impact on Hired Labor Days in Farming Activities (Sample of Respon-
dents that Trust their PO Leaders)
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 34.5 35.4 32.0 36.3 35.7 33.4
(24.9) (25.1) (24.4) (28.2) (27.9) (28.1)
IoS 35.9* 31.7 25.3 24.0 18.2 15.7
(20.6) (19.3) (18.7) (18.8) (17.6) (18.0)
both -19.0 -9.0 -13.9 -11.2 -0.3 -8.6
(12.7) (13.1) (13.1) (14.0) (15.3) (13.8)
Observations 266 261 265 266 261 265
R2 0.066 0.142 0.109 0.062 0.135 0.097
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.051 0.063 0.018 0.043 0.050
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PO-level.
All estimations control for stratification on the DC level.
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Table 3.21:
Impact on Labor Days of Hired Labor for Crop Production (Sample of
Respondents that Trust their PO Leaders)
First Season Second Season
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CoD 36.4* 38.8* 44.5* 52.3* 51.7 72.2
(20.1) (20.9) (24.7) (31.0) (35.2) (45.4)
IoS 26.2 25.4 59.8** 21.8 20.9 51.9*
(17.8) (15.5) (26.3) (22.4) (20.7) (31.0)
both -9.3 0.6 7.7 3.3 18.2 22.9
(12.2) (12.9) (15.1) (20.6) (24.3) (30.7)
Observations 156 154 105 152 151 100
R2 0.079 0.237 0.130 0.115 0.194 0.139
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.089 0.005 0.038 0.033 0.009
Individual level covariates no yes no no yes no
Initial value of Y as covariate no no yes no no yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PO-level.
All estimations control for stratification on the DC level.
CHAPTER IV
The Impact of a Formalization Intervention in
India
4.1 Introduction
Informality of large parts of the workforce and the majority of self-employed
entrepreneurs is a characteristic of most developing country economies. In India,
informal self-employment accounts for 92 percent of all self-employment in rural and
for 95 percent in urban areas (NSSO, 2012). Claims exist that these unregulated
segments of the economy create disadvantages on several grounds (Ge¨rxhani, 2004).
Regarding economic development, the large share of entrepreneurial activities outside
of the tax system curtails the public sector’s capacity to provide goods and services.
As for social security, a large informal sector is directly opposed to the inclusion of
workers to the benefit schemes.
Therefore, developing country governments, development academics and practi-
tioners have strong interest in the inclusion of unregistered, informal activities. Yet,
most research on the informal sector has focused on explaining its existence (de Soto,
1989; Gelb et al., 2009; Loayza et al., 2005). The work of Perry et al. (2007) identifies
two rationales underlying informality. Under the first, entrepreneurs exit formality
consciously, i.e. they operate informally after weighing the pros and cons of formal-
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ization. The second rationale, called the exclusion view, presumes that high direct
and indirect costs and burdensome processes render the formal sector inaccessible
for microentrepreneurs, forcing them to remain ”in the shadows”. Though not men-
tioned in the literature, the two processes can work simultaneously, too.
In large parts, the existing literature on formalization studies how changes in
the regulatory framework or increased enforcement thereof affect the size of the
informal sector (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012; Bruhn, 2011; Fajnzylber et al., 2011;
Ihrig and Moe, 2004; Loayza, 1994). This approach rather addresses informality
as a result of entrepreneurs exiting formality. With the rise of rigorous impact
evaluation in development economics, researchers started to assess how benevolent
manipulation affects the clients’ formalization decision. de Mel et al. (2013) test
the exclusion theory in Sri Lanka and document the irrelevance of formalization for
microentrepreneurs given its costs and the prospects it offers. They find no effect on
formalization when all costs for licensing fees are reimbursed and basic information
is provided. It is only when entrepreneurs are paid additional money for registering
that formalization increases significantly. This suggests either that mere registration
is not sufficiently interesting or that the indirect costs attached to registering are
non-negligible.
The present work looks at the effect of reducing the indirect costs of formaliza-
tion. At the focus of the study is the Evangelical Social Action Forum (ESAF), an
Indian NGO that pilot tested an intervention to foster formalization among its mi-
crofinance clients, henceforth called ’the clients’. The intervention explains in detail
the advantages of formalization for the self-employed. In addition, the beneficiaries
were actively encouraged and supported in their efforts to register.
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In summary, our findings document that once information on benefits and pro-
cedures are provided and some support to register is given, formalization rates soar
among the group of clients that ESAF identified as ”ready-to-grow” clients. Using
a difference-in-difference estimation strategy we estimate substantial and significant
effects on registration. The large share of treated clients that decided to formalize
allows us to test whether subsequent outcomes were affected by formalization. Here
the results are disappointing as we find very few significant effects. We do not find
any impact on annual turnover, on investment in new machinery, on electrification
of the business, on ownership of bank accounts or insurance of the business, nor on
the household’s monthly income.
We find positive and significant effects on a series of outcome indicators that are
related to the perception of the business. We find a significant positive impact on
plans to expand the business. We find significant positive impact on the perceived
role that the enterprise plays for the household. And we find a positive effect on
advertisement activities.
When it comes to employment we observe that the number of clients who hire
employees decreases significantly. This suggests either that entrepreneurs are not
reporting their employees, as they might not have reported them to the authorities,
or that registration truly gives incentives to reduce the number of employees in the
microenterprise.
The paper proceeds by giving background information on the context, the imple-
menting agency and the intervention in section 2. In section 3 we discuss the impact
evaluation design, the data collection and the sample. Section 4 presents the results
and the last section concludes.
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4.2 Context and the Intervention
The informal sector comprises all income generating activities that are not reg-
istered with official authorities. The official authorities are industries centers, tax
agencies and the local government. In 2008, ESAF conducted a study among 200 of
its clients to gather information on work related challenges that they encounter. This
study revealed that 85 percent of the self-employed clients did not have any kind of
registration of their activity; 69 percent of the self-employed did not conduct even
basic bookkeeping such as maintaining notes of income and expenditure; 88 percent
of the self-employed clients did not pay taxes. Of the clients who had employees only
24 percent provided their staff with some kind of social benefits, usually paid on the
basis of ad-hoc and informal arrangements (ILO, 2008).
And most importantly, the clients were not aware of the benefits available for
formal entrepreneurs. The Indian governments has put in place incentive schemes
to render formalization beneficial for small and micro-entrepreneurs: Tax reduction,
reduction of the costs for licenses for poor entrepreneurs, subsidies for training or
business related expenses.
In developing countries this is a common picture. Yet, ESAF assumes that a num-
ber of its informal self-employed clients has the potential to expand their enterprise,
but due to their informal status they could not access bank services or government
support schemes. As a consequence ESAF developed a strategy to support ready to
grow clients in the formalization process.
4.2.1 Formalization and its Benefits
ESAF considers formalization as an important factor for the growth of enterprises.
Formality allows access to loans from banks that are larger than the micro credits
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that can be obtained from ESAF. Further, formalization allows access to subventions
through government schemes. The requirement to maintain and submit business
information regularly clearly is a burden but forces formal enterprises to closely
monitor their activities which can have positive effects on business management.
The improved business practices along with a better access to finance and markets
opens up business expansion avenues for formal enterprises that remain closed under
informal activity.
On the other hand, ESAF is aware of the financial burden that formalization
implies. Formality requires entrepreneurs to pay relevant taxes and to submit finan-
cial documents. The taxes combined with the costs for registering add up to the
enterprise’s non-operational expenses and discourage entrepreneurs to formalize.
4.2.2 The Intervention
The implementing agency, ESAF, reckons that for a certain group of its clients
the main obstacles to formalize are low awareness about the advantages, overrating
of the disadvantages and a lack of information on the formalization process rather
than a lack of funds to cover the costs induced by formalization. The latter includes
the upgrades of business processes that are necessary to be eligible for registration.
To address issues of formality and support the business expansion of its ready-to-
grow clients, ESAF implemented awareness raising campaigns to explain registration
and formalization processes and created business development services (BDS) for its
clients. The issue of the costs of formalization was left to the microentrepreneur.
To provide the specific non-financial services, ESAF created a new capacity among
its staff: the business development officer (BDO). BDOs are responsible for collect-
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ing and elaborating information materials on registration, facilitating sensitization
workshops at branch level and providing individual counseling to the clients.
ESAF recruited three BDOs and appointed one to each of the three states that
were included in the impact evaluation: Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. The
BDOs conducted 10 information campaigns to promote formalization and explain
the registration process to the clients. The campaigns were conducted from May
until August 2010 and reached 410 selected clients. Besides posters and meetings
the campaigns included the following programs:
In the treatment branches, training sessions were held with batches of 30-40
clients. These served the purposes of introducing to and sensitizing the clients on
formalization. During these sessions it was explained in detail how to formalize a
microenterprise through registration with the local district industries center (DIC)
and government agencies. The clients were also encouraged to expand their markets
through fairs or exhibitions.
At individual client visits the BDO reiterated the messages on the benefits of
formalization. And during regular interaction at weekly meetings the clients received
briefing sessions on marketing and accounting.
4.3 Evaluation Design, Data Collection and Estimation Strat-
egy
In April and May 2010 a baseline survey was conducted in twelve branches with
a total of 670 respondents. From the six treatment branches 340 clients were inter-
viewed and from the six control branches 330 clients were interviewed. Overall, the
majority of respondents were female. In Tamil Nadu and Kerala they were exclu-
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sively females, while in Maharashtra the majority was male. All respondents were
loan clients.
In intervals of six months three follow-up surveys were conducted allowing us now
to construct a panel data set. Attrition, i.e. drop-out of respondents, is a relevant
problem especially in the treatment group where we observe around 10 percent of
attrition between baseline and the first follow-up survey, henceforth follow-up I. In
the control branches on the other hand the number of respondents even increased by
10 percent. At the second follow-up survey we observe an increase in the treatment
sample to the level of baseline. The control group sample at follow-up II shows an
attrition of around 6 percent compared to the baseline. For the analysis we use only
individuals who were present at all three interviews.
The initial evaluation design called for a cluster randomized trial where within
each of the three regions two branches would have been allocated at random to each
treatment and control. In other words, stratification by region was planned initially.
This would have assured that observable and unobservable characteristics within the
three regions were similar in the two groups. Of course treatment allocation on the
branch level is to be applied in this context as random allocation on the individual
level would result in spill-over effects within branches. This kind of contamination
of the control group would have posed a threat to the internal validity of the study.
Within the respective branches only clients with very specific characteristics qual-
ified for formalization and subsequently for the treatment as well. This revealed to
influence also the allocation of the branches. Instead of four branches there were
only three branches with a sufficient number of eligible clients in the region Tamil
Nadu. In Kerala, seven instead of four branches had to be included in order to reach
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the number of eligible clients. In Maharashtra on the other hand only two branches
were included, both with a sufficiently high number of eligible clients.
4.3.1 Identification Strategy
The availability of data collected before and data collected after implementation
of the intervention allows us to apply a double difference identification strategy1. This
method, also called difference-in-difference estimation, differs from single difference
methods that estimate the impact of an intervention by comparing outcomes of
treated and untreated individuals only after implementation.
Single difference methods rely on the assumption that it is possible to rule out
unobservable differences between the treated and untreated by controlling for observ-
able characteristics, i.e. conditional on covariates X one assumes exogeneity of the
treatment2: Y d⊥D|X. Where Y d represents the individual’s potential outcome un-
der treatment status D ∈ {0, 1}. The actual outcome Yt can be observed at t = 0, 1.
We generally omit index i for the individual.
The identification strategy of the double difference method is to cancel out dif-
ferences existing at baseline under the assumption that these are constant over time.
In other words, the differences that exist at baseline would persist over time and
both groups would experience ”parallel” development if the intervention does not
take place. In addition to the assumption of parallel time trends, we need to assume
that measurement error, if present, affects both groups in the same way.
1This subsection draws on Ravallion (2008).
2The notation draws on Fro¨lich (2008).
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We obtain the double difference estimate (DD), by subtracting the difference
between control group outcomes at follow-up and baseline from that of the treatment
group:
(4.1) DD = E(Y 11 − Y 10 |D1 = 1)− E(Y 01 − Y 00 |D1 = 0) = E(G1|D1 = 1)
Obviously, Y 1i0 = Y
0
i0 = Yi0 since the intervention has not yet taken place at t = 0.
Under the assumption that
(4.2) E(Y 01 − Y 00 |D1 = 1) = E(Y 01 − Y 00 |D1 = 0)
we obtain the average treatment effect on the treated E(G1|D1 = 1) as an estimate
of the intervention’s true impact Gi1 = Y
1
i1 − Y 0i1 which relies on the counter factual
that cannot be observed for one individual i.
Ravallion (2008) explicitly points out the scenario where no change over time
occurs in the control group, E(Y1 − Y0|D1 = 0) = 0. In this special case the DD-
estimate is equal to a before-and-after comparison of control group outcomes.
Given that imbalances exist between the two groups in our sample we employ the
difference-in-difference strategy to evaluate the impact of the formalization treat-
ment. This allows us to estimate causal effects even in the presence of pre-treatment
imbalances between treatment and control group.
4.3.2 Baseline Information by Treatment Status
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for the treatment and control group before
the launch of the intervention. The sample consists mainly of married women from
households of around 4.5 members. The clients’ age across treatment and control
group is fairly balanced. Just in the youngest age bracket the control branches have
a significantly higher share with 15 percent of clients being of age 18 to 27 compared
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to only 3 percent in the treatment group. It also shows that the treatment clients are
older on average when we look at the share of clients in age group 48 to 57 where we
observe a share of 20 percent at baseline compared to 11 percent in the control group.
Imbalances between the two groups exist also in education. The control group has a
higher share of clients with higher secondary education and a lower share of clients
who have only primary education.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics by Treatment Group
Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control -difference p-value
Client information
Female .85 .72 .13 .00
Married .91 .85 .06 .03
Household(HH) size 4.47 4.36 .11 .41
HH members earning income 1.97 1.76 .2 .01
Age of client
18 to 27 .05 .15 -.09 .00
28 to 37 .34 .39 -.05 .28
38 to 47 .4 .34 .06 .18
48 to 57 .2 .11 .09 .01
above 58 .01 .02 .00 .75
Client’s education
No formal schooling .07 .07 .00 .98
Primary .15 .07 .08 .01
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.1 continued
Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control -difference p-value
Upper Primary .25 .19 .06 .12
Secondary .39 .4 -.01 .83
Higher Secondary .1 .16 -.06 .05
Client’s type of activity
Agriculture .02 .04 -.01 .36
Hotel/Restaurant .14 .11 .03 .25
Mobile trading .07 .02 .05 .01
Production .08 .13 -.05 .09
Services .03 .11 -.08 .00
Trade/Commerce .44 .44 .01 .84
Sample Size 245 257
With regard to comparability we observe significant differences in age as well as
in education across treatment and control group. However, for both variables these
differences concern smaller parts of the sample. I.e. the most prevalent age groups,
28 to 37 years and 38 to 47 years, are balanced across treatment and control groups.
Only for the age brackets with few observations we observe significant differences.
For education it is similar. Upper primary and secondary education comprise of over
60 percent of the sample in both groups. And only the less frequent education levels
show significant differences. Higher secondary education for example is five percent
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higher in the control group at baseline. Interestingly, it does not remain constant in
the control group and rather increases.
When it comes to the type of activity, a majority of over 44 percent of the entire
sample engages in trade and commerce activities. The prevalence of agricultural
activities is low with only two percent in both groups. We observe significant dif-
ferences between the two groups for services and mobile trading3. Services are more
frequent in the control group while mobile trading is in the treatment branches. Also
the share of clients who created their business in partnership with somebody is fairly
similar in both groups. The share of clients who had some training for their business
is also equally high across the two groups. However, when it comes to the funds that
were used to create the business we see that the share of entrepreneurs who used
their own funds is about 30 higher in the treatment group.
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for the clients’ enterprise at baseline. Slightly
above 30 percent of the respondents own a production unit4. The average age of the
business is around seven to eight years. Most businesses were created by one person
and only very few are endeavors that the client started in cooperation with a partner.
The share of people who had any specific training before the creation of the business
is below 20 percent at baseline.
3Services include mostly small street side hotels, food canteen, tailoring units and electrical and
electronics repair and service centers.
4A production unit is a category of microenterprises which are involved in making food, deter-
gents, soaps, phenol, ready made garments, jewelery, bags, brooms, handicrafts, manufacture of
nuts, bolts and other similar activities.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Client Enterprise by
Treatment Group
Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control -difference p-value
Owns production unit .4 .32 .08 .05
Age of business 8.54 8.16 .38 .27
Opened business in partnership .16 .15 .01 .73
Opened business after special training .16 .19 -.04 .29
Sample Size 245 257
The imbalances that we observe call for a difference-in-differences estimation. We
explain the estimation strategy in the following section.
4.3.3 Estimation Strategy
This section presents the empirical strategy applied for the analysis of the in-
tervention’s impact on a series of outcome indicators. The ideal impact assessment
would measure the net difference in the outcome variables between randomly as-
signed treatment and control individuals. In the present case six branches were
selected for implementation of the intervention and six branches were allocated to
the control group. Within the treatment branches the intervention was available to
all clients. Hence, the variation is on branch-level, not on the individual level. In
absence of random assignment of the intervention to ESAF’s clients a series of other
evaluation methods are available to identify the effect on the treatment clients. E.g.
119
a naive estimate of the impact would simply compare the levels of outcome variables
of interest before and after the intervention was conducted. Of course, this estimate
would only require information on clients from treatment branches. The drawback
of this strategy lies in the incapacity to tell whether the resulting difference is solely
attributable to the intervention. Other (unobservable) factors could have affected the
outcome variables and hence lead to an over- or underestimate of the intervention’s
impact.
The availability of baseline information, i.e. information before the intervention
was implemented, and information gathered at several points in time after the inter-
vention allows us to follow a difference-in-difference (DD) evaluation strategy. We
obtain the DD estimator by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on the pooled
sample, i.e. estimating the following equations for all observations (i = 1, ..., n) from
all points in time (t = 0, 1, 2, 3):
(4.3) Yit = α +DD(DiI(t > 0)) + βDi +
3∑
p=1
γptp + it
The outcome variable is Yit. The dummy variables tp are period-fixed effects.
For individual i we observe every variable at time t = 0, 1, 2, 3. In equation 4.3 the
coefficient of interest is DD. It captures the effect of an interaction term between the
dummy variable Di, that is equal to one for individuals from treatment branches, and
an indicator for observations from post-treatment periods, I(t > 0). In our regression
tables we label this coefficient overall treatment effect and display it in Column (1).
Its estimation does not take into account individual client or business characteristics.
In Column (2) of the estimation tables we present the overall treatment effect when
such control variables are included in the estimation:
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(4.4) Yit = α +DD(DiI(t > 0)) + βDi +
2∑
p=1
γptp + δXit + it
In Columns (3) and (4) of the estimation tables we present estimates of period-
specific DD treatment effects, DDq for q = 1, 2. This means we estimate coefficients
that indicate the impact at follow-up I survey and follow-up survey II:
(4.5) Yit = α +
2∑
q=1
DDq(Dit) + βDi +
3∑
p=1
γptp + it
Again we provide estimates of these effects with and without individual control
variables. Though not presented here, we further generalize the model in equation
4.5 to include also a term to estimate DD3. This coefficient will be presented in
Column (5) without covariates and Column (6) with covariates.
In all regression tables we present coefficient estimates and the respective p-values
to document the level of significance. A p-value below 0.05 indicates that the distance
between estimate and zero exceeds two standard deviations. All regressions apply
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The control variables included are gender
of the client, marital status, number of household members and number of household
members who earn any income.
4.4 Results
This section presents the empirical analysis of ESAF’s formalization intervention.
It starts off with a presentation of summary statistics for the treatment and control
group. Throughout this section the tables presenting descriptive results contain the
number of observations in both groups, estimates of the mean for the variable under
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consideration, the difference in means, i.e. mean of treatment group minus the mean
of the control group, and p-values from a test for statistical significance in means.
4.4.1 Impact on Formalization
In this section we assess the impact on knowledge about formalization and on
the status of registration. Entrepreneurs in Kerala and Tamil Nadu can register
their activities with the directorate of industries and commerce (DIC). In Maha-
rashtra, registration is either with the Department of Labor or with the Municipal
Corporation. In addition to the registration status, we look at the take up of ser-
vices and products that formalization supposedly eases, such as financial products
or government support schemes.
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Figure 4.1:
Do you know about Formaliza-
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Figure 4.2:
Have you registered your busi-
ness?
Figure 4.1 provides a graph of the share of clients that state that they know about
formalization for each survey round. It shows that awareness about formalization is
low at baseline in both groups. At follow-up I ESAF’s activities to inform about and
promote formalization improved awareness as the share of informed clients increases
to 80 percent while it remains low in the control group.
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Figure 4.3:
Do you wish to register your
business?
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Figure 4.4:
Are you willing to pay for the
registration?
Figure 4.2 shows the share of clients that registered at the four different points
in time that we observe. The sample consists strictly of informal clients at baseline,
and we observe that the business registrations increase to over 60 percent among the
treated clients at follow-up I. In the control group registrations remain rare. This is
despite the fact that at baseline almost 80 percent of the control respondents stated
that they would like to register (Figure 4.3). At baseline we also observe that those
planning to register are willing to do so even if registration comes at a cost. The
lack of registrations in the control group despite high initial willingness to register
suggests that ESAF’s assistance services contributed to the high rate of formalization
in the treatment group.
Table 4.3: Impact on Formalization
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Knows about formalization
Overall treatment effect .93 .929
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.3 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS I .898 .897 .853 .897
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS II .949 .948 .904 .948
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS III .853 .943
.00 .00
Registered business
Overall treatment effect .688 .687
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS I .642 .642 .677 .641
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS II .732 .732 .767 .731
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS III .759 .688
.00 .00
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values. The inference is
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions reported in
columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported in columns (2),(4) and (6)
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The empirical analysis confirms the descriptive picture. The formalization in-
tervention had an important effect on awareness and registrations. We estimate an
impact of 93 percent on awareness about issues of formalization and of 68.9 percent
on actual registrations. As indicated by the p-values in the last column of Table 4.3
both effects are significant at the 1 percent level.
Access to Financial Products
Formalization can ease access to a range of services and products inaccessible
when operating informally. At the outset slightly more respondents avail of a bank
account in the treatment branches. Figure 4.5 presents the share of clients who hold
a bank account. The trend over time is positive for both groups. After follow-up I
the share of control clients with bank account still grows but less pronounced than in
the treatment branches. Table 4.4 presents p-values of a difference-in-means tests in
Column 6. It shows that there are significant differences in bank account ownership
at follow-up I and follow-up II, so that the intervention has increased access to formal
financial institutions.
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Figure 4.5: Do you have a bank account?
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Figure 4.6: Business bank account
The clients were also asked whether they use their bank account for personal
matters only, for business matters only, or for both. We observe that the accounts
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are rarely used only for professional reasons. Figure 4.6 reveals that at baseline bank
accounts opened under the name of the business activity are rare. In both groups
roughly ten percent avail of accounts with a formal bank at baseline and this share
drops to almost zero at later points. One possible explanation for the decrease in this
share could be increased awareness about what a separate bank account is. The drop
being more steep in the treatment branches might indicate that the formalization
increased understanding in the issue. Since we rule out contamination of the control
group an explanation for the decrease in the share of business bank accounts in the
control group might be that interviewing itself raised awareness of the respondents
causing them to revise their response during later interviews.
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Use of Financial Prod-
ucts by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Do you own a bank account? (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .58 .53 .05 .25
FS I 245 256 .67 .68 -.01 .73
FS II 244 253 .75 .64 .11 .01
FS III 245 257 .76 .65 .11 .01
Business bank account? (0/1)
Baseline 143 136 .1 .07 .03 .34
FS I 163 175 .00 .01 -.01 .17
FS II 183 160 .02 .02 .00 .87
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.4 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS III 183 167 .01 .00 .01 .18
Is your firm insured? (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .08 .06 .02 .39
FS I 245 256 .03 .01 .02 .05
FS II 245 255 .01 .01 .00 .96
FS III 245 257 .04 .04 .00 .92
In Table 4.5 we examine the intervention’s impact on outcome indicators reflect-
ing the access to formal financial products. Though statistically insignificant, the
difference-in-difference estimates for the effects on access to financial products sug-
gest a small positive impact on access to formal bank accounts. The overall effect
shows a 2 percent increase in bank account holders. The overall impact on bank
accounts opened specifically for business purposes is negative and insignificant. In
Columns (3) and (4) however we observe a negative 3 percent impact at the first
follow-up that is significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 4.5: Impact on Use of Financial Products
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Do you own a bank account? (0/1)
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.5 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall treatment effect .018 .016
.73 .74
Treatment effect FS I -.065 -.068 -.065 -.067
.29 .26 .29 .27
Treatment effect FS II .055 .051 .055 .053
.36 .4 .36 .38
Treatment effect FS III .063 .064
.29 .29
Business bank account? (0/1)
Overall treatment effect -.033 -.031
.33 .34
Treatment effect FS I -.043 -.041 -.043 -.042
.2 .22 .2 .22
Treatment effect FS II -.034 -.033 -.034 -.033
.34 .36 .34 .36
Treatment effect FS III -.021 -.02
.54 .55
Is your firm insured? (0/1)
Overall treatment effect -.01 -.009
.67 .71
Treatment effect FS I .006 .007 .006 .006
.83 .79 .83 .81
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.5 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect FS II -.019 -.017 -.019 -.017
.45 .5 .45 .48
Treatment effect FS III -.017 -.016
.53 .57
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values. The inference is
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions reported in
columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported in columns (2),(4) and (6)
Neither the descriptive nor the empirical results show any evidence for an effect
on the variable ”Is your firm insured?”. After baseline we observe a sharp drop in the
share of insured ESAF clients in both groups. The drop being stronger in the control
group results in a significant difference between controls and treated at follow-up I.
To explain this temporary significant difference one could argue that both groups
decreased the demand for insurance products and that the intervention cushioned
this decrease for the treatment group. Regardless of the significant difference at
follow-up I, the estimation results presented in Table 4.5, give no significant evidence
that the intervention improved access or demand to formal financial products.
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Figure 4.7: Have you insured your firm?
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Figure 4.8: Member in any other network
Impact on Membership in Professional Networks and Access to Govern-
ment Support Schemes
Leaving informality can enable microentrepreneurs to draw benefits from join-
ing trade associations or applying for government support that require operating
licenses5. We refer to trade associations as networks. Figure 4.8 shows how the
share of clients who are members in such networks fares over time. We see a differ-
ence of eight percent between the treatment and the control group at baseline that
is significant at the ten percent level and suggests that the control group is better
connected at the outset (Table 4.6). At follow-up I the share of treatment clients
who are members in other networks increased by 19 percent to 53 percent whereby
the difference to the control group is still insignificant. At follow-up II membership
in such networks is significantly higher by 10 percent in the treatment group.
Table 4.6 presents descriptive statistics on awareness about and access to govern-
ment schemes. The p-values in the last column indicate that at any point in time
there is a significant difference in the awareness about such schemes between treat-
ment and control group. Over time we see that awareness more than triples in the
5Support programs include free health checks, business skill development training, access to
government loans etc.
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treatment group. From 11 percent at baseline it increases to 35 percent at follow-up
III. Yet the number and the share of clients who benefited from such programmes is
low in general. The share is even higher in the control group across all waves. But
a mere glance at averages is deceiving here since the number of control clients for
whom we observe this information is very low.
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics for Networks and Access
to Government Schemes by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Member in other professional networks (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .34 .42 -.08 .07
FS I 244 257 .53 .47 .06 .17
FS II 245 225 .53 .43 .11 .02
Aware about Government support schemes (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .11 .07 .05 .06
FS I 245 255 .08 .01 .07 .00
FS II 245 255 .35 .04 .31 .00
Benefitted from Government support schemes (0/1)
Baseline 28 17 .32 .47 -.15 .33
FS I 20 2 .75 1.0 -.25 .45
FS II 85 9 .28 .67 -.38 .02
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For the last survey wave, follow-up III, more detailed questions were included
in the survey asking whether the clients had actually applied for a public support
scheme, and if yes, whether benefits were received. Table 4.7 shows that 17 percent
of the treatment group compared to only 4 percent of the control group had applied
for any scheme. The share of clients responding that they had received benefits from
this scheme is equally high in both groups at about 40 percent.
Table 4.7: Summary Statistics on Access to Government
Schemes by Treatment Group
Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control -difference p-value
Applied for support (last 2 yrs)
FS III 244 256 .17 .04 .13 .00
Received benefits
FS III 43 11 .42 .45 -.04 .83
4.4.2 Impact on Clients’ Enterprise and Market Linkages
Management Practices
In this section we analyze variables reflecting business performance and mar-
ket integration. The intervention used training of basic book keeping principles to
improve the clients’ management practices. We see in Figure 4.9 that roughly 40
percent in both groups maintain books of accounts at baseline. While the treatment
group has a slightly lower share of clients who maintain such books we observe that
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the share surpasses the control group at follow-up I and is about ten percent higher
at follow-up III.
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Figure 4.9: Maintains book of accounts?
Our estimations indicate that the intervention had a positive and significant im-
pact on this measure of business management practice. The magnitude of the overall
impact is fairly large with 14.6 percent when controlling for individual characteris-
tics. The wave-specific impact is even at 17.9 percent at follow up III (see Table
4.8).
Table 4.8: Impact on Keeping Business Records
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Maintains book of accounts (0/1)
Overall treatment effect .141 .146
.01 .00
Treatment effect FS I .07 .071 .157 .161
.19 .18 .01 .01
Treatment effect FS II .007 .01 .093 .1
.89 .84 .13 .11
Treatment effect FS III .173 .179
.00 .00
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions reported in columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on
all observations from all waves (pooled sample). The regressions
reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported
in columns (2),(4) and (6)
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Annual Turnover
Figure 4.10 presents the share of clients in the six different classes of annual
turnover that were recorded during the interviews. For treatment and control group
the average lies at around Rs. 70,000-80,000 in both groups at baseline. Though
upward sloping, the average is fairly constant from baseline to follow-up III. In the
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Figure 4.10: Annual turnover (in Rs.)
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Figure 4.11: Turnover ≥ Rs. 100,000
treatment group annual turnover is constantly higher than in the control group which
results mainly from a higher share of clients earning more than Rs. 100,000. In the
treatment group this share is constantly at 40 percent and goes up to even 50 percent
in the last wave. While there is no significant difference in turnover at baseline, we
observe a slump in the highest income class for the control group in Figure 4.11 that
leads to a significant difference between the two groups. The p-values displayed in
Table 4.9 show significant differences at follow-up I in the highest income class.
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Table 4.9: Summary Statistics of Annual Turnover (in
Rs.) by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
≤10000
Baseline 245 257 .01 .02 -.01 .35
FS I 245 257 .02 .02 -.01 .57
FS II 245 257 .01 .00 .00 .54
FS III 245 257 .03 .07 -.03 .08
10001-30000
Baseline 245 257 .1 .14 -.04 .19
FS I 245 257 .04 .06 -.01 .5
FS II 245 257 .05 .06 -.01 .66
FS III 245 257 .04 .06 -.01 .5
30001-50000
Baseline 245 257 .2 .2 .00 .96
FS I 245 257 .12 .09 .03 .29
FS II 245 257 .09 .15 -.06 .03
FS III 245 257 .09 .09 .00 .89
50001-70000
Baseline 245 257 .09 .12 -.03 .25
FS I 245 257 .15 .09 .05 .06
FS II 245 257 .19 .14 .04 .19
Continued on next page...
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Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS III 245 257 .1 .11 -.01 .59
70001-80000
Baseline 245 257 .08 .11 -.02 .37
FS I 245 257 .08 .32 -.24 .00
FS II 245 257 .13 .2 -.07 .03
FS III 245 257 .07 .06 .01 .61
80001-100000
Baseline 245 257 .12 .07 .06 .03
FS I 245 257 .16 .27 -.11 .00
FS II 245 257 .13 .16 -.03 .42
FS III 245 257 .14 .11 .04 .2
≥100001
Baseline 245 257 .39 .35 .05 .29
FS I 245 257 .43 .14 .29 .00
FS II 245 257 .4 .28 .12 .00
FS III 245 257 .52 .51 .02 .71
The difference-in-difference estimates of the impact on annual turnover presented
in Table 4.10 are all insignificant. The overall estimate of the impact on annual
turnover is close to zero. Yet, we observe a significant impact on the share of clients
in the highest turnover bracket, i.e. annual turnover above Rs. 100,000. The effect
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is significant at the 10 percent or 5 percent significance level, depending on whether
we control for individuals characteristics or not. The period specific estimations in
Columns (3)-(6) reveal that this effect is driven by the control group’s slump in
turnover at follow-up I (see Figure 4.11 above). Given the assumption of parallel
time trends holds these results suggest that in the absence of the intervention the
treatment group would have suffered from a similar slump. But the estimates in the
lowest row in Columns (5) and (6) show that at endline the impact is close to zero,
negative and insignificant. It remains a puzzle what could have caused the sharp
slump in the share of clients in the highest income bracket in the control group.
Table 4.10: Impact on Annual Turnover (in Rs.)
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual turnover (1-7)
Overall treatment effect .00 .019
1 .92
Treatment effect FS I .128 .135 .095 .11
.5 .48 .68 .63
Treatment effect FS II .005 .02 -.028 -.004
.98 .91 .9 .98
Treatment effect FS III -.066 -.05
.79 .83
Turnover ≥100001
Overall treatment effect .097 .101
.05 .04
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect FS I .261 .262 .247 .249
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS II .089 .092 .075 .079
.09 .08 .22 .19
Treatment effect FS III -.029 -.025
.64 .68
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values. The inference is
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions reported in
columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported in columns (2),(4) and (6)
Annual turnover is a categorical variable taking on values 1-7 according to the income
brackets listed in table 4.9
Expansion Plans
We observe an a priori difference in expansion plans that emphasizes the need
to apply an difference-in-difference evaluation strategy. In both groups, the clients
selected for participation were to fulfill the condition to have plans to expand their
business. Despite this being an overall condition for participation, we observe that
among treatment group clients plans to expand are significantly more prevalent at
baseline. Table 4.11 presents the descriptive analysis for expansion plans, and shows
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that all through the period of observation, this share remains significantly higher in
the treatment group.
Table 4.11: Summary Statistics of Plans to Expand Busi-
ness by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Plans to expand
Baseline 245 257 .8 .61 .19 .00
FS I 245 256 .82 .63 .19 .00
FS II 245 255 .73 .53 .21 .00
FS III 245 257 .72 .62 .1 .02
Investment in Machinery
As can be seen from Table 4.12 descriptively there is only a minor difference in
the investment in new productive assets. In both groups around 40 percent stated
at baseline that they bought new machinery. Both groups see a decline in such
investments. At follow-up I and II we document a decrease to around 30 percent,
which is even succeeded by a further decline to 20 percent at follow-up III. Also the
cost of the acquired machinery is similar for both groups. Only at follow-up III we
observe a significant difference in the average cost of the new machinery whereby it
is the control group that had higher investments.
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Figure 4.12: Bought any new machinery
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Figure 4.13: Cost of machinery
The cost at which the clients acquire the new machinery is on average at Rs.
5,000 to 25,000. As depicted in Figure 4.13 the development over time is constant
and similar in both groups. One might thus conclude that the intervention has not
had a significant impact on investment in new machines6.
Table 4.12:
Summary Statistics of Investment in Productive Assets by Treatment
Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Bought any new machinery
Baseline 245 257 .42 .38 .04 .37
FS I 245 256 .34 .29 .05 .23
FS II 245 255 .33 .27 .06 .17
FS III 245 257 .22 .18 .05 .2
Cost of machinery
Baseline 102 97 2.09 1.92 .17 .25
FS I 84 75 2.14 2.16 -.02 .92
FS II 80 64 1.93 2.17 -.25 .14
FS III 55 44 2.04 2.43 -.4 .05
6In Figure 4.13 the vertical axis is labeled with 1 = ’below Rs. 5000’, 2 = ’Rs. 5000-25,000’, 3
= ’Rs. 25,000-50,000’.
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Employment
Employment is an essential outcome indicator to assess the growth of the clients’
enterprise. Figure 4.14 displays the share of ESAF clients who have any employee in
their enterprise. Figure 4.15 shows the average number of employees in both groups
for those who have employees. The share of ESAF-clients who hire employees is far
lower in the control group with only 26 percent as compared the treatment group
where it is at 41 percent. Table 4.13 shows that the baseline difference is highly
significant. At the first follow-up interview employment in the treatment group
declined by 22 percent, such that both groups have a share of 19 percent of clients
with any employees. At follow-up II employment picks up again in both groups, and
we observe very small insignificant differences only.
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Figure 4.14: Do you have employees?
0
5
0 1 2 3
wave
Target group Control group
Source: ESAF−ILO data
Figure 4.15: Number of employees
The size of the enterprise, measured by the number of employees, is slightly higher
in the treatment group at all points in time whereby it is only at follow-up III where
the difference is significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 4.13: Summary Statistics on Employment in
Client’s Enterprise by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Do you have employees? (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .41 .26 .16 .00
FS I 245 257 .19 .19 .00 .98
FS II 245 257 .28 .25 .02 .53
FS III 245 257 .22 .23 -.01 .81
Number of employees
Baseline 101 66 3.33 2.64 .69 .18
FS I 46 47 4.83 3.6 1.23 .46
FS II 45 62 3.29 3.08 .21 .8
FS III 54 59 3.63 2.27 1.36 .07
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The estimates of the impact on the share of clients who have any employees are
negative and significant. The descriptive results indicate that this effect is driven
by the strong decrease in the treatment group at follow-up I. Several interpretations
for this phenomenon can be offered. (1) Formalization might give incentives to
reduce the number of employees (to zero). (2) The number of employees might
have remained the same but formalized respondents could feel uneasy to report
unregistered employees in the interview. The former could be considered a negative
side-effect of formalization. Among those that hire, the number of employees was
not affected.
Table 4.14: Impact on Employment in Client’s Enterprise
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Do you have employees? (0/1)
Overall treatment effect -.15 -.155
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS I -.154 -.159 -.154 -.16
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS II -.131 -.135 -.131 -.136
.02 .02 .02 .02
Treatment effect FS III -.165 -.168
.00 .00
Number of employees
Overall treatment effect .243 .007
.75 .99
Treatment effect FS I .54 -.235 .54 -.124
.75 .89 .75 .94
Treatment effect FS II -.482 -.948 -.482 -.806
.58 .29 .58 .36
Treatment effect FS III .668 .834
.45 .36
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values. The inference is
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions reported in
columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported in columns (2),(4) and (6)
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Access to Electricity
Ease of access to electricity is one advantage that formalization supposedly offers.
Through special programmes microentrepreneurs are offered reductions on their elec-
tricity bills. In our sample the intervention did not make a difference. As shown in
Figure 4.16 the availability of electricity in the business at baseline is slightly lower
in the treatment group with a share of 59 percent compared to 67 percent in the
control group. While the control group share remains constant it increases in the
treatment branches by 6 percent. Though statistically insignificant, at follow-up III
we observe even a slightly positive difference in favor for the treatment group (Table
4.15). Despite the slight increase the overall impact estimate is close to zero and
insignificant (Table 4.16).
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Figure 4.16: Business has electricity?
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Table 4.15: Summary Statistics on Accesss to Electricity
by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Business has electricity (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .59 .67 -.07 .09
FS I 245 256 .55 .65 -.1 .03
FS II 245 255 .62 .65 -.02 .6
FS III 245 257 .65 .63 .01 .73
Table 4.16: Impact on Access to Electricity
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business has electricity (0/1)
Overall treatment effect .038 .04
.44 .42
Treatment effect FS I -.024 -.025 -.024 -.022
.7 .68 .7 .72
Treatment effect FS II .051 .049 .051 .053
.4 .42 .4 .38
Treatment effect FS III .088 .088
.15 .15
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values. The inference is
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions reported in
columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported in columns (2),(4) and (6)
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Demand, Advertisement and Market Linkages
Figure 4.17 and Figure 4.18 present the share of ESAF clients who report that
their product is in high or low demand, respectively. The share of clients who report
that their product is in high demand is at roughly 55 percent at baseline for both
groups. Both groups see a decline in this share at follow-up I. This decline is stronger
for the treatment group. However, after follow-up I, the indicator remains constant
while it further declines in the control group. At follow-up III the share of clients
who have high demand for their product is 14 percent higher in the treatment group
(Table 4.17).
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
0 1 2 3
wave
Target group Control group
Source: ESAF−ILO data
Figure 4.17:
Is your product in high de-
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Figure 4.18:
Is your product in low de-
mand?
The difference-in-difference estimates of the overall effect of the intervention
on the indicator variable ”product is in high demand” is insignificant (Table 4.18,
Columns (1) and (2)). The effect for the last follow-up is significant at the 10 percent
level (columns (5) and (6)), i.e. treatment group clients have an 11 percent higher
probability to state that there is high demand for their products. We observe the
same pattern but with reversed signs for low demand. The overall effect is insignif-
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icant but the estimate for the last follow-up is significant and amounts to an 11
percent decrease in the probability to state that demand is low.
Table 4.17: Summary Statistics on Demand and Adver-
tisement by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Is your product in high demand? (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .55 .53 .03 .56
FS I 244 255 .41 .47 -.06 .17
FS II 244 255 .43 .35 .08 .06
FS III 245 251 .43 .29 .14 .00
Is your product in low demand? (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .42 .44 -.02 .66
FS I 244 255 .56 .49 .07 .13
FS II 244 255 .53 .61 -.08 .07
FS III 245 251 .54 .68 -.13 .00
Do you advertise? (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .27 .22 .05 .18
FS I 245 256 .38 .26 .12 .00
FS II 245 255 .53 .31 .22 .00
FS III 245 257 .6 .49 .11 .01
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In part the observed pattern might be directly related to advertisement activities.
Figure 4.19 shows that the share of advertising clients increased more strongly in the
treatment group. At the baseline it was already higher for the treatment group with
27 percent compared to 22 percent in the control group but this difference was not
significant (Table 4.17). At follow-up I, however, the mean difference amounts to
12 percent and is significant at the one percent level. At the second follow-up the
difference increases to 22 percent and then drops again at follow-up III to 11 percent.
At follow-up III the majority of 60 percent of the treatment group claims to engage
in advertising.
The estimations presented in Table 4.18 provide evidence for the causal effect of
the intervention on advertisement activities. This outcome is of special interest since
the training conducted in the treatment group also included marketing and advertis-
ing. Any effect here can be attributed directly to the formalization activities. The
estimate of the overall effect is 9.9 percent and has a p-value indicating significance
at the 5 percent level.
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Figure 4.19: Do you advertise?
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Figure 4.20: Do you export?
Figure 4.20 shows the share of clients who export their products. Almost 6 percent
of treatment group clients export their products at baseline. In the control group
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the share is slightly lower at 4 percent. In both groups product exports decline at
follow-up I but stronger so in the treatment branches. However, the treatment group
sees an increase in exports after follow-up II while it drops to zero in the control
group. Though not depicted here, the estimates for the impact on exports are all
insignificant and close to zero.
Table 4.18: Impact on Demand and Advertisement
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Is your product in high demand? (0/1)
Overall treatment effect .028 .023
.58 .65
Treatment effect FS I -.086 -.09 -.086 -.09
.17 .15 .17 .15
Treatment effect FS II .056 .051 .056 .051
.37 .41 .37 .4
Treatment effect FS III .116 .109
.06 .07
Is your product in low demand? (0/1)
Overall treatment effect -.029 -.024
.57 .64
Treatment effect FS I .087 .091 .087 .091
.17 .14 .17 .14
Treatment effect FS II -.06 -.055 -.06 -.055
.34 .37 .34 .37
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect FS III -.115 -.108
.06 .07
Do you advertise? (0/1)
Overall treatment effect .099 .098
.03 .03
Treatment effect FS I .066 .066 .066 .068
.24 .24 .24 .23
Treatment effect FS II .173 .171 .173 .172
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS III .058 .053
.32 .36
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values. The inference is
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions reported in
columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported in columns (2),(4) and (6)
4.4.3 Impact on Household Income
Monthly Household Income
Figure 4.21 presents monthly household income. For both groups the graphs have
positive slopes, whereby the control group peaks at follow-up I and the treatment
group has overall a higher income growth from baseline to follow-up III. As Figure
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Figure 4.21: Monthly household income
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Figure 4.22: Income <10.000
4.22 shows, the share of clients in the lowest income class, i.e. income < Rs. 10,000,
declines in both groups between baseline and follow-up I, but the decrease is steeper in
the control group. This decrease is accompanied by increases in the two other income
brackets. Especially, for the income bracket ”Rs. 20,001 - 30,000” we observe a large
difference in the increase between treatment and control clients. For the control
group the share of clients in this income class increases from virtually zero to 20
percent (Figure 4.24).
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Figure 4.23: Income 10001 - 20000
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Figure 4.24: Income 20001 - 30000
Table 4.19 allows a more thorough look at the income situation. Among treatment
clients a share of 67 percent has monthly household income below Rs. 10,000 at
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baseline. Among control clients this share is significantly higher at 82 percent. Both
groups see substantial shifts from the lowest to the next income group (Rs. 10,001-
20,000). In the control group the share of clients in the lowest income group decreases
by 50 percent already at follow-up I. While in the treatment group the shift is
mostly to the second income class (Rs. 10,001 - 20,000 Rs.) we observe that in
the control group the share of clients with income between Rs. 20,001 - 30,000
increases substantially, too.
At follow-up III, we observe significant differences in income group three (Rs.
20,001 - 30,000) and four (Rs. 30,001 - 40,000), both in favor for the treatment
group. Yet, the share of clients with monthly household income higher than Rs.
30,000 is only 2 percent in the treatment group.
Table 4.19: Summary Statistics on Monthly Household
Income by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Monthly Household Income
≤10000
Baseline 245 257 .67 .82 -.15 .00
FS I 245 257 .49 .33 .16 .00
FS II 245 257 .47 .47 .00 .95
FS III 245 257 .33 .46 -.12 .00
10001-20000
Baseline 245 257 .26 .16 .1 .01
Continued on next page...
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Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS I 245 257 .44 .49 -.05 .27
FS II 245 257 .41 .44 -.03 .48
FS III 245 257 .53 .49 .04 .42
20001-30000
Baseline 245 257 .04 .01 .03 .02
FS I 245 257 .06 .16 -.1 .00
FS II 245 257 .09 .08 .02 .52
FS III 245 257 .11 .05 .06 .02
30001-40000
Baseline 245 257 .01 .01 .00 .96
FS I 245 257 .01 .02 -.01 .45
FS II 245 257 .01 .01 .00 .96
FS III 245 257 .02 .00 .02 .01
40001-50000
Baseline 245 257 .00 .00 .00 .31
FS I 245 257 .00 .01 .00 .59
FS II 245 257 .01 .00 .01 .15
FS III 245 257 .00 .00 .00 .31
≥50001
Baseline 245 257 .01 .00 .01 .29
FS I 245 257 .00 .00 .00
Continued on next page...
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Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS II 245 257 .00 .00 .00 .31
FS III 245 257 .00 .00 .00
Table 4.20 assesses whether the shift from the lowest income group to higher
income groups is constrained to certain economic activities. In both groups, all
clients with agricultural businesses are in the lowest income group at baseline and
in both groups this share decreases substatially at follow-up I. Much more however
in the treatment group where only 29 percent of the clients in agriculture remain in
the lowest income group. In the treatment group we observe a stark decline in low
incomes from 100 to 29 percent for clients with agricultural activities. This might
indicate that seasonal effects drive the upward shift in incomes. In the control group
the share of agricultural clients in the lowest income group decreases as well but
the change is much weaker. In all other activities in both groups the share in the
lowest income category declines, too, In the control group it is largest for the trade
and service activities, which are likely to have much less seasonal fluctuation than
agriculture.
We present the difference-in-difference estimates for the impact of the intervention
on monthly household income in Table 4.21. The overall effect of the intervention
in Columns (1) and (2) is negative and significant. This would suggest that the
intervention has caused a decrease of incomes of households in the treatment group.
A glance at columns (3) to (6) reveals that the drop in incomes at follow-up I drives
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Table 4.20:
Share in Lowest Income Class (<10,000) by Type of Activity and Treat-
ment Group
Control Treatment
Survey wave Baseline FS I FS II FS III Baseline FS I FS II FS III
Agriculture/Animals 1.0 .83 .6 .67 1.0 .29 .5 .00
Hotel/Restaurant .79 .45 .46 .52 .57 .38 .39 .28
Mobile trading .8 .39 .29 .44 .88 .42 .7 .43
Production .8 .46 .55 .58 .55 .44 .31 .27
Services .79 .31 .5 .53 .75 .46 .55 .44
Trade/Commerce .81 .23 .47 .35 .67 .59 .44 .36
Total .82 .33 .48 .46 .67 .49 .47 .335
this result. Also the coefficients for follow-up II are negative though lower in size
and in significance. Since the increase in incomes is observed in the control group
for all professions the explanation of seasonal fluctuation would only be a valid one
if all professions were subject to these fluctuations.
The treatment group’s improved capacities to keep records of their business and
household finances offers an alternative explanation for the changes in income (see
Section 4.4.2). Improved and more factual book-keeping, e.g. through keeping
records of expenses, costs, purchases, profits, can bring out more realistic figures. In
the control group, on the other hand, clients continue the usual procedure of keeping
records. Yet, the changes in income in the control group refute this explanation.
Table 4.21: Impact on Monthly Household Income
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monthly Household Income
Overall treatment effect -.224 -.22
.00 .00
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect FS I -.518 -.509 -.518 -.51
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS II -.172 -.161 -.172 -.162
.06 .06 .06 .06
Treatment effect FS III .018 .013
.83 .87
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values. The inference is
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions reported in
columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported in columns (2),(4) and (6)
Main Source of Household Income
The household enterprise plays an important role for the majority of clients in
both groups (Figure 4.25). Over 70 percent generate the main income through a
household enterprise, followed by 30 percent that do so through casual wage labor.
In the treatment group 69 percent of clients at baseline generate the main source of
income from the household enterprise and this increases to 94 percent at follow-up
I (Table 4.22). At follow-up II we observe a slight decrease to 91 percent and to
86 percent at follow-up III but still the share remains constantly higher than in the
control group.
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The descriptive results for the main source of income are presented in Table 4.22.
In both groups, around ten percent of clients generate their main income through
regular wage labor. The shares for commissioned/contracted work as well as for
remittances are below five percent in both groups. For the latter we observe a
significant difference at follow-up III. The effect size is small though at 2.5 percent
overall and 4.1 percent in the last survey wave.
Table 4.22: Summary Statistics on Main Income Source
of Household by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Main income source
Casual Wage Labour (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .29 .28 .01 .73
FS I 245 257 .22 .29 -.07 .09
Continued on next page...
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Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS II 244 257 .27 .21 .06 .11
FS III 245 257 .2 .27 -.07 .07
Household enterprise (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .69 .82 -.13 .00
FS I 245 257 .94 .89 .06 .03
FS II 245 257 .91 .89 .02 .46
FS III 245 257 .86 .82 .04 .18
Regular salary (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .09 .11 -.02 .57
FS I 245 257 .13 .08 .05 .06
FS II 245 257 .14 .11 .03 .38
FS III 245 257 .11 .11 .00 .97
Comissioned/Contract work (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .03 .01 .02 .11
FS I 245 257 .03 .02 .02 .21
FS II 245 257 .02 .03 -.01 .45
FS III 245 257 .04 .05 -.01 .45
Remittances (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .01 .02 -.01 .45
FS I 245 257 .04 .02 .02 .14
FS II 245 257 .02 .02 .00 .95
Continued on next page...
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Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS III 245 257 .05 .02 .03 .03
In Table 4.23 the overall impact in Columns (1) and (2) tells us that as a result
of the intervention the share of clients who state that the household enterprise is
the main income source increased by 17 percent. The effects for follow-up I and
follow-up II in Columns (3) and (4) are all positive and significant as well. One
might conclude that the clients’ perception of the importance that her enterprise has
for the household has changed due to the formalization intervention.
Regarding the other sources of income, the relevance of casual wage labor was not
affected but we observe a small and significant impact of 3 percent on the importance
of remittances. Specifications (5) and (6) indicate that this effect appears only at
follow-up III. The causal interpretation of this effect suggests that the intervention
has (indirectly) increased the dependence or necessity of remittances in the treatment
group.
Table 4.23: Impact on ”What is the main income source
of the household?”
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household enterprise (0/1)
Overall treatment effect .171 .169
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS I .187 .185 .187 .188
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS II .151 .147 .151 .149
.00 .00 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS III .175 .171
.00 .00
Casual wage labour (0/1)
Overall treatment effect -.039 -.033
.4 .47
Treatment effect FS I -.081 -.076 -.081 -.077
.15 .17 .15 .16
Treatment effect FS II .046 .056 .046 .055
.4 .31 .4 .32
Treatment effect FS III -.082 -.076
.14 .16
Remittances (0/1)
Overall treatment effect .026 .025
.04 .04
Treatment effect FS I .029 .028 .029 .027
.1 .1 .1 .11
Treatment effect FS II .008 .008 .008 .007
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
.58 .6 .58 .62
Treatment effect FS III .041 .041
.03 .03
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values. The inference is
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions reported in
columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported in columns (2),(4) and (6)
4.4.4 Impact on Client’s Loan Size and Repayment
As can be seen from figure 4.27 and Table 4.24 the loan size differs only by a
small amount (Rs. 513) at the start of the intervention. The amount of the last
loan remains almost constant in the treatment group until follow-up survey II and
only slightly picks up towards follow-up survey III. The control group sees more
fluctuation in this outcome. At first, loan size decreases by about Rs. 1,700 and
then, at follow-up survey II, it increases by Rs. 5,400. The decrease we observe in
follow-up survey III is small again.
The direct comparison between treatment and control group for this outcome is
difficult. As mentioned, at baseline the difference is only small and insignificant. At
follow-up survey I we observe that on average the treatment group takes out signif-
icantly higher loans. The averages for follow-up survey II show a highly significant
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Figure 4.28: Repayment Difficulties
difference, with the control group taking out loans that are on average Rs. 3400
higher. Cautiousness is required when interpreting this result as in the treatment
group at follow-up II and III about 100 clients state to have either ”Loan expired”
or ”Loan closed”.
Table 4.24: Summary Statistics on Clients’ Relation to
ESAF by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Amount of last EASF loan (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 12967.3 13480.5 -513.2 .32
FS I 245 256 13156.9 11826.7 1330.2 .08
FS II 144 245 13833.3 17236.7 -3403.4 .00
FS III 197 232 15685.8 15866.4 -180.6 .83
No ESAF loan (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .00 .00 .00
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.24 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS I 245 257 .00 .00 .00 .33
FS II 245 257 .49 .05 .44 .00
FS III 245 257 .21 .12 .09 .01
Difficulties repaying loan (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .07 .06 .01 .62
FS I 245 257 .03 .02 .01 .32
FS II 219 254 .05 .02 .02 .19
FS III 197 237 .05 .05 .00 .83
Unforseen expenses (0/1)
Baseline 245 257 .43 .53 -.1 .02
FS I 245 257 .37 .24 .13 .00
FS II 245 256 .3 .45 -.15 .00
FS III 244 256 .34 .41 -.08 .07
At follow-up survey III the significant difference disappears and both groups have
loans of on average Rs. 16,000. The problem is less pronounced here with only 50
observations having missing value. Still missing values in the treatment group come
exclusively from Tamil Nadu. The variable No ESAF loan captures whether the
individual has either missing value for amount last loan or zero. We observe that
at baseline and follow-up survey I every respondent stated that she had a positive
loan. At follow-up survey II nearly half of the treatment group has no last loan. At
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follow-up III this share is at 20 percent. One explanation for the high occurrence
of missing values is that clients who formalize become eligible for loans from formal
banks. This in addition to the argument that they might require loans of a size that
ESAF cannot deliver might explain the phenomenon starting at follow-up survey II.
However, a comparison of means within the treatment group at follow-up survey II
shows that among those who registered the share of no ESAF loan is lower than
among those who did not register. A t-test also provides significant evidence that
the share of clients without loan is higher among unregistered clients.
Table 4.25: Impact on Loan Behavior
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last loan amount
Overall treatment effect 12.68 87.5
.99 .9
Treatment effect FS I 1843.44 1856.91 1843.44 1827.27
.05 .03 .04 .04
Treatment effect FS II -2890.2 -2513.32 -2890.2 -2625.04
.00 .01 .00 .00
Treatment effect FS III 332.61 310.03
.75 .76
Difficulties in repaying loan (0/1)
Overall treatment effect .00 .00
.93 .95
Treatment effect FS I .00 .00 .00 .00
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.25 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
.95 .97 .95 .96
Treatment effect FS II .01 .01 .01 .01
.7 .74 .7 .73
Treatment effect FS III -.01 -.01
.82 .82
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values. The inference is
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions reported in
columns (1),(2),(5),(6) are based on all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) exclude follow-up III observations.
Individual covariates are included in regressions reported in columns (2),(4) and (6)
When we consider the estimations for the impact on loan size (table 4.25) we
need to take into account the prevalence of missing values. The overall effect on loan
size is insignificant which comes with no surprise since the differences at baseline
and follow-up survey III are only small. The effect at follow-up survey I, however, is
positive and significant when estimated by model 3, i.e. as a result of the intervention
clients from treatment branches took out loans that were about Rs. 1,800 higher than
in the control group. At follow-up survey II the effect reverses, with control clients
having loans that are about Rs. 3,000 higher. At follow-up survey III the impact is
at only Rs. 800 and insignificant. The fact that the sign switches for different points
in time becomes apparent when looking at Figure 4.27. It shows that the amount of
the last loan fluctuates in opposing directions at follow-up survey I and II.
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Figure 4.28 shows that repayment difficulties are slightly more prevalent in the
treatment branches. However, we learn from Table 4.24 that the difference is not
significant at any point of investigation. The difference-in-difference estimates for
repayment difficulties are all close to zero indicating that the capacity to repay a
loan was not affected.
4.5 Conclusion
The assessment of ESAFs formalization intervention shows that for microfinance
clients with well established informal enterprises formalization is a welcome option.
We observe that mere distribution of information on the benefits and processes cou-
pled with targeted support for the registration leads to substantial rates of formal-
ization. This suggests that the direct costs of formalization can be borne by the
entrepreneurs. The increase in registrations persists over the period of investigation
which leads us to subsume that the consequential costs of formalization e.g. through
payment of taxes do not exceed the benefits that the entrepreneurs draw from the
change in status.
What remains unclear is what are the benefits that the entrepreneurs draw ex-
actly from formalization. Beyond increased access to government support schemes we
observe little evidence that points to an improved situation in the treatment group.
Hard business indicators, such as turnover, did not change. Given the high registra-
tion rates and concurrent tax obligation, the latter suggests rather that profits from
the business activity must have decreased. The increased reliance on remittances
that we observe might compensate for the assumed reduction in profits.
On the other hand, the positive effects on ’soft’ outcomes such as the perception of
the business or, also on the entrepreneurs subjective assessment on product demand,
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show that formalization nurtured aspirations in the treatment group. A follow-up
to observe the long-term sustainability could possible show whether formalization
succeeded in satisfying these aspirations.
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CHAPTER V
The Impact of a Formalization Intervention in
Burkina Faso
5.1 Introduction
The informal sector’s importance for African economies is no longer an issue of
dispute. Its high relevance for income generation is well established (Benjamin et al.,
2012) and so is the fact that it is not a transitory phenomenon (Ihrig and Moe, 2004).
The literature now recognizes also the sector’s heterogeneity, as it encompasses a
wide range of different activities, different industries, and harbors enterprises varying
substantially in size and productivity (Grimm et al., 2012; Trager, 1987).
Yet, a continuing discussion deals with the question how to address issues that
enterprises face in the informal sector. Despite the fact that the sector is recog-
nized as a permanent feature of the economy, formalization remains an answer to
this question. The present paper assesses an intervention that fosters formalization
among the clients of a large microfinance institution in Burkina Faso. The imple-
menting agency is the Re´seau des Caisses populaires du Burkina (RCPB), a savings
and credit cooperative with over 151,000 active borrowers and 852,000 depositors12.
1Information available on http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/rcpb.
2RCPB has 159 branches in 44 out of the 45 provinces of Burkina and is the largest micro finance
provider in the country.
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According to RCPB the costs accruing from formalization and the lack of in-
formation about it are the main obstacles keeping its clients from registering their
activities. The agency claims that lack of correct information leads clients to form
unrealistic perceptions of formalization. This leads clients who could otherwise ben-
efit from formality to remain informal3 In order to increase the rate of formalization,
RCPB tackles ignorance and the distorted picture that its clients have about formal-
ity.
Three main goals are at the heart of RCPBs efforts to support formalization
among its clients. The first goal is to increase security and stability, which might
both accrue from registration as it liberates clients from risks related to informality:
the threat of business closure from fiscal authorities, the risk of penalty payments for
violating regulations, and the burden of repeated bribe payments that can consume
large parts of the business revenue and potentially exceed the volume of tax liabilities
that registered enterprises face. Especially, successful informal enterprises run these
risks as they are most prone to attract the inspectors’ attention (Djankov et al.,
2003).
Secondly, it is only after formalization that enterprises can grant their employees
access to the ”Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale” (CNSS), the social security sys-
tem in Burkina Faso4. Thirdly, enrollment with the local authorities gives increased
pressure on RCPBs clients to keep records of their business activities which, by itself,
can be expected to have positive effects on business management.
The literature on the informal sector in West Africa offers further reasons in
favor for formalization. Bo¨hme and Thiele (2012) provide evidence that the infor-
3For a more general discussion of the reasons of informality and the relevant literature see
Chapter IV.
4The CNSS covers costs related to sickness, accidents and maternity and provides an old age
pension scheme (see http://www.cnss.bf/index_eng.html.)
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mal sector in the region faces demand constraints. They argue that increases in
income lead people to shift consumption from informal products to products from
the formal sector. E.g., informal distribution channels turn to deliver formal rather
than informal products. Grimm et al. (2012) coin the term of constrained gazelles
that refers to informal enterprises with high profitability but little access to capi-
tal. Those RCPB clients falling under this category might unleash entrepreneurial
potential after formalization as RCPB access to larger business loans on it.
Our analysis of the pilot intervention shows that formalization can be fostered in
the targeted segment. However, we observe that entrepreneurs revise their decision
quite quickly and return to informality.
The paper continuous with a description of the intervention in the next section.
We present the data and the evaluation strategy in section 3 and the results in section
4. In section 5 we discuss the results.
5.2 The Context and Intervention
Regarding the level of formalization RCPB categorizes its clients in three groups5.
The first group consists of unregistered enterprises that do not pay taxes, nor any
other official fees. This group of entrepreneurs is not enrolled with the CNSS, nor is
it registered with the Maison de l’Entreprise du Burkina Faso (MEBF) that issues
a unique financial identification (UFI) number and requires registered entrepreneurs
to submit financial statements. The second group is labeled informal sector enter-
prises. These are semi-formalized enterprises, recognized by the MEBF, holding a
UFI number and possibly holding an Informal Sector Card or a Commercial Card.
These cards are issued by the Centre de Formalite´s des Entreprises (CEFOR). They
5For a discussion of different definitions of the informal sector see Lubell (1991).
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give proof of legal recognition but are no titles yet for formal activity. Clients in this
group pay taxes on profits and they pay for patents. They are not enrolled with the
CNSS.
Formal enterprises, the third group, hold a Commercial Card, have a UFI number
and, in addition to the taxes on their profits and charges for patents, they pay a value-
added-tax on goods and services and taxes on commercial or industrial benefits. The
tax rates they face are higher than those for the second group. Further, affiliation
to this category requires that the enterprise is enrolled with the CNSS and pays the
contribution for at least some of the employees6.
The intervention has three different features. First, the treatment group clients
were invited to a sensitization workshop. At the workshop formalization procedures,
the risks of informality, and the advantages of formalization were illustrated. Second,
a training workshop was conducted that treated topics like stock management, costs
management, accounting, financial budgeting, the services of the CNSS and formal-
ization procedures. Regarding the latter, it was explained in detail what judicial
form and fiscal regime the clients could choose and what administrative issues the
formal creation of an enterprise requires. These topics were identified by RCPB as
substantial knowledge gaps among the clients.
The first two components were implemented in November 2010 and only 209
of the 300 treatment clients participated. The third component provided additional
incentives for formalization. A competition was announced where good formalization
practice was to be rewarded. The entrepreneurs were to be evaluated according
6Registering a formal enterprise requires the entrepreneur to subscribe with CEFOR. The pro-
cedure costs approximately CFA 50,000 to 65,000 and takes up to three month. The required
documents are a passport, a commercial card or informal sector card, a financial balance, proof of
tax payments, a work contract of at least one employee, CNSS certification, the lease agreement
for the business localities and proof of a bank account.
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to their degree of formalization, the number of employees that had enrolled with
the CNSS, their orderliness in tax and CNSS payments and their orderliness in
accounting. In addition, RCPB promised a reduction in the interest rate as financial
incentives to clients that registered their activities.
Two issues arise with the implementation of the interventions. First, regarding
workshop participation, we cannot distinguish between treatment group clients that
participated and treatment group clients that did not participate. Second, while the
interest rate reduction and the competition were announced, we are not aware about
their implementation. Both issues lead us to interpret our estimates as Intention-to-
Treat effects.
5.3 Data and Evaluation Strategy
5.3.1 Data Collection
We use data from three successive rounds of client surveys. The baseline sur-
vey was conducted in April 2010, the first follow-up in May 2011 and the second
follow-up in November 2011. RCPB had identified a total of 300 clients from three
RCPB branches to participate in the intervention and 300 clients from three control
branches to serve as the control group. All branches are located in the capital city
of Ouagadougou. In our analysis we include only those clients that we observe at all
three surveys, i.e. 243 individuals from control and 248 individuals from treatment
branches. Table 5.1 shows the number of individuals per branch. We observe at
most 90 individuals per branch.
5.3.2 Summary Statistics
The implementing partner, RCPB, selected the participating branches, conducted
the allocation to treatment and control and, within branches, selected the partici-
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Table 5.1: Number of observations
Branch
Treatment Branches
Cissin 81
Dapoya 90
Sig-Noghin 77
Control Branches
Dassasgho 77
Gounghin 84
Song Taaba 82
Total 248 243 491
pating clients. It is likely that the selected branches were targeted for their specific
characteristics, e.g. ease of logistical implementation. On the individual level the
sample selection followed a non-random strategy. Only informal clients were selected
for whom formalization is a valuable alternative from RCPBs point of view. Also
RCPB stated that clients who have problems operating informally will be prioritized.
The targeting on the branch and individual level certainly has implications for the
generalizability, i.e. the external validity, of our results.
The internal validity - the validity of inferences about whether a relationship is
causal - might be affected by the selective targeting if treatment and control group
have structurally different characteristics (Todd, 2008). Table 5.2 presents summary
statistics of treatment and control clients at baseline. It includes the number of
observations for both groups, the mean of the respective variable, the difference in
means, and the p-value from a t-test for statistical significance of the mean difference.
It shows that some client characteristics significantly differ between treatment
and control before the start of the intervention. The share of female clients is at 18
percent in the treatment group and about 10 percent higher in the control group.
Age of the client differs significantly but the disparity is relatively low. The size of
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the household shows no significant difference. In both groups clients have on average
almost nine household members of which two earn income.
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -diff p-value
Female client 247 243 .18 .27 -.09 .02
Age of client 238 242 40.79 42.17 -1.37 .08
Household (HH) size 246 243 8.58 8.68 -.1 .83
Number HH income earners 247 243 1.96 2.1 -.14 .34
Children in school 234 223 .91 .99 -.07 .00
Client’s education
No formal schooling 248 243 .37 .27 .1 .02
Primary 248 243 .38 .26 .12 .00
Secondary 248 243 .3 .3 .00 .96
Higher Secondary 248 243 .04 .06 -.02 .26
Informal apprenticeship 248 243 .09 .13 -.04 .17
Technical formation 248 243 .08 .09 -.01 .7
Age of business 237 237 15.23 13.95 1.28 .09
Sector of activity
Commerce 243 237 .89 .81 .08 .01
Services 243 237 .04 .11 -.07 .00
Production 243 237 .05 .04 .00 .87
Agriculture 243 237 .00 .01 .00 .55
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.2 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Construction 243 237 .02 .03 -.01 .53
While the average age of the business is around 15 years in both groups we see
some considerable differences in the sector of activity. Commercial activities make
the bulk in both groups but are significantly more prevalent in the treatment sample
with 89 percent compared to 81 in the control group. The control group, on the
other hand has significantly higher engagement in service activities. Agriculture or
construction are very rare in both groups. For the client’s education we also see
considerable differences.
The differences in observables lead us to assume that selective targeting took place
in some way when RCPB implemented the pilot interventions and selected the clients
that form now the treatment group. This gives rise to assume that unobservable
characteristics suffer equally from selection bias. We discuss in the next session how
our evaluation design mitigates this bias. Another potential source of bias lies in
sample attrition. After data cleaning, roughly 17 percent of both treatment and
control group are lost due to incomplete information. We cannot provide evidence
for the underlying reasons of this attrition.
5.3.3 Evaluation Design
To answer the question whether RCPBs clients in the treatment branches showed
increased rates of formalization we apply a difference-in-difference identification strat-
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egy. Since the data was collected before and after the intervention we can deal in
this fashion with preexisting time constant differences between the treatment and the
control group. If not addressed properly these differences would potentially introduce
bias in our impact estimates.
Time inconstant differences might equally occur and pose a threat to the assump-
tion of parallel time trends that underlies the difference-in-difference identification.
To mitigate this second source of bias matching strategies have been proposed (Raval-
lion, 2008). Through propensity score matching we focus our analysis on control and
treatment observations that have a similar probability at baseline to be allocated for
treatment. In other words, based on the observable characteristics, the two groups
look alike. This increases the likelihood of them having similar time-trends.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of Propensity Score at Baseline
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5.3.4 Estimation Strategy
To mitigate the problem of targeted program selection we estimate the propensity
score at baseline. This index allows us to verify how similar the two groups are in
terms of propensity to be treated, based on a set of observable characteristics78.
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the propensity score for both, the treatment and
the control group. The kernel density estimates are cut off at the respective outer
boarders. The vertical lines designate the region of common support (.26, .74). We
delete 20 observations located outside of these bounds, i.e. 7 controls at the lower and
13 treatment clients at the upper end, under the rationale that these observations
have no corresponding match in the respective other group.
On the basis of this matched sample we estimate the following equation for indi-
vidual i to obtain the difference-in-difference estimator DD9:
(5.1) Yit = α +DD(DiI(t > 0)) + βDi +
2∑
p=1
γptp + δXit + it
where Yit is the outcome variable of interest, tp are dummy variables for period
p = 1, 2, Di indicates affiliation to a treatment branch and Xit contains control
variables assessed at baseline. By interacting the treatment indicator Di with a
dummy variable that takes value one for all post-intervention periods we obtain an
estimate of the overall impact. To assess the period specific impacts at t = 1 and
t = 2 we estimate the following equation:
7We include the covariates gender of the client, number of household members, dummies for
different types of education and the age of the enterprise and a dummy taking value one if the
client’s enterprises generated above 1 Mio FCFA at baseline. The education variables are all dummy
variables, each taking on value one for primary education, for secondary education or more, for an
informal apprenticeship or for a formal technical formation, respectively.
8See Todd (2008) for a detailed description of the propensity score.
9See chapter IV for a discussion of difference-in-difference estimation.
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(5.2) Yit = α +
2∑
q=1
DDq(Ditp) + βDi +
2∑
p=1
γptp + i
where DD1 gives us an estimate of the impact at follow-up I and DD2 at follow-up
II.
In all estimations we apply heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. One might
suspect that the intraclass correlation coefficient is large within branches. This would
generally call for inference based on clustered standard errors. However, due to
the low number of clusters in our analysis this kind of correction might lead us to
underestimate the intraclass correlation (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
5.4 Results
This section presents the empirical results of RCPB’s formalization pilot. Gener-
ally, the tables that present estimation results contain difference-in-difference coeffi-
cient estimates for the impact of the intervention and the according p-values. The
estimates reported in Columns (1) and (2) are based on the estimation of Equa-
tion 5.1 and measure the intervention’s impact by the difference in change between
baseline and all post-baseline observations. We refer to this as the overall treatment
effect. The estimation results in Column (1) are obtained without inclusion of co-
variates. For the estimation results in Column (2) control variables are included. In
Columns (3) and (4) we present the period specific impacts obtained by estimation
of Equation 5.2. We include the same control variables that were used for estimation
of the propensity score.
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5.4.1 The Impact on Formalization
Formalization Status
As pointed out in section 5.2 different degrees of formalization exist and en-
trepreneurs can register with two institutions, the MEBF, where entrepreneurs reg-
ister to fulfill their tax liability, and CEFOR that issues commercial and informal
sector cards. At baseline, the availability of informal sector cards is low. The share of
clients who hold informal sector cards increases from 11 percent to 16 percent in the
treatment group. The control group has a similar share at baseline, but at follow-up
II we only observe a share of 4 percent of informal sector cards. The difference at
follow-up II is statistically significant, what indicates that registrations as informal
entrepreneur were successfully fostered by the intervention.
The share of clients that hold commercial cards is already substantial at the
outset in both groups, but especially so in the treatment group. At baseline 41
percent of the treatment clients have a commercial card, compared to 34 percent in
the control group. The mean difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent
level, giving some indication for the endogenous program placement. At follow-up
I 51 percent of the treatment group hold a commercial card. However, the share
decreases again at follow-up II, where only 35 percent of the treatment group state
to have a commercial card. This provides further evidence that RCPBs intervention
was successful in fostering registrations in the short term, but the effect could not be
sustained, as one year after the intervention registration rates drop below the initial
level.
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Table 5.3: Summary Statistics on Formalization Status
by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -diff p-value
No card
Baseline 248 243 .46 .48 -.02 .63
FS I 248 243 .3 .34 -.04 .35
FS II 248 243 .27 .26 .01 .86
Informal sector card
Baseline 248 243 .11 .09 .02 .51
FS I 248 243 .13 .12 .01 .75
FS II 248 243 .16 .04 .12 .00
Commercial card
Baseline 248 243 .41 .34 .07 .09
FS I 248 243 .51 .42 .09 .05
FS II 248 243 .35 .36 -.01 .87
Fiscal attestation
Baseline 248 243 .09 .04 .05 .02
FS I 248 243 .17 .09 .08 .01
FS II 248 243 .1 .11 -.01 .71
Social security
Baseline 248 243 .05 .06 -.01 .8
FS I 248 243 .13 .08 .05 .09
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.3 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS II 248 243 .09 .07 .02 .44
The share of clients that have a UFI number is also unbalanced at baseline. In
the treatment 10 percent fulfill this formalization requirement compared to only 4
percent in the control group. This difference is significant at the 5 percent level.
While the share in the control group increases, the share in target group shows
more fluctuation over the period of investigation. Regardless, both groups end up
with roughly 10 percent of clients having a UFI number at follow-up II. While this
represents a 100 percent increase for the control group, the treatment group is at its
initial level. Inscription with the CNSS start out with 5 percent in the target and 6
percent in the control group. In the target group this share goes up to 13 percent at
follow-up I and then slightly decreases again. The control group on the other hand
does not see large fluctuation at all.
Table 5.4: Summary Statistics on Registration status by
Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -diff p-value
Not registered
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.4 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Baseline 242 242 .42 .4 .02 .71
FS I 248 238 .32 .35 -.03 .48
FS II 192 183 .3 .4 -.1 .05
Registered as informal
Baseline 242 242 .4 .42 -.02 .71
FS I 248 238 .5 .52 -.01 .78
FS II 192 183 .54 .45 .09 .09
Registered as formal
Baseline 242 242 .18 .18 .00 1
FS I 248 238 .18 .13 .04 .19
FS II 192 183 .16 .15 .01 .81
Pays TVA
Baseline 248 243 .2 .17 .03 .35
FS I 248 243 .25 .17 .08 .03
FS II 248 243 .17 .16 .00 .89
Pays industrial fee (BIC)
Baseline 248 243 .15 .17 -.02 .64
FS I 248 243 .22 .1 .12 .00
FS II 248 243 .15 .06 .09 .00
Pays patent fees
Baseline 248 243 .88 .77 .11 .00
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.4 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS I 248 243 .88 .8 .08 .02
FS II 248 243 .67 .68 -.01 .89
Regarding the registration status with MEBF both groups start with around 40
percent of clients who are not registered. At follow-up I this share decreases in both
groups. In the treatment group it remains low at follow-up II while it increases
to the initial level in the control group. The difference in unregistered clients is
statistically significant at endline. In the target group informal registrations increase
by 14 percent from 40 to 54 percent. In the control group informal registration
increase in the first period but decrease afterwards to 42 percent which is below the
initial level. The share of formal registrations shows a small decline from 18 to 16
percent in the treatment group. In the control group it decreases by 3 percent from
18 to 15 percent.
Table 5.5 presents the difference-in-difference estimation results of the impact on
formal recognition expressed by possession of official documents, i.e. informal sector
and commercial card. We observe a positive and significant impact on the share of
individuals holding informal sector cards. The overall effect is small and insignificant
at around 5 percent. However, the estimate for follow-up II amounts to a significant
10 percent increase. Respecting the underlying assumptions this gives prove for a
causal effect of the intervention on informal sector card possessions. Inspection of
Figure 5.2 also shows that the share of RCPB clients holding such a card continuously
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increased in the treatment branches while on the other hand in the control branches
a sharp decline after follow-up I is observed. A similar pattern occurs for registration
as informal business in Figure 5.4. The share for both control and treatment group
clients that registered their informal activity is at around 40 percent at the outset,
increases until follow-up I, continuous to increase in the treatment group but levels
off in the control group.
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Figure 5.2: Informal sector card
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Figure 5.3: Commercial card
Table 5.5 presents the difference-in-difference estimation results of the impact
on card possession. We observe a positive and significant impact on the share of
individuals holding informal sector cards. The overall effect is small and insignificant
at around 5 percent. However, the estimate for follow-up II amounts to a significant
10 percent increase. Respecting the underlying assumptions, this gives proof for a
causal effect of the intervention on informal sector card possessions. Figure 5.2 shows
that the share of clients holding such an informal sector card continuously increased
in the treatment branches while it decreased in the control branches after follow-up
I.
We observe that the share of clients who state that they have a UFI number is
affected negatively. The estimate at follow-up I is low and insignificant but positive.
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This reverses at follow-up II where we obtain a negative impact estimate ranging
from 7.2 to 8 percent with significance at the 10 percent level. This suggests that
clients cancel their registration with CEFOR in the long run.
Table 5.5: Impact on Formalization
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
No card
Overall treatment effect -.003 -.004
.96 .94
Treatment effect FS I -.03 -.03
.63 .63
Treatment effect FS II .025 .029
.69 .66
Informal sector card
Overall treatment effect .038 .046
.27 .2
Treatment effect FS I -.013 -.012
.76 .76
Treatment effect FS II .089 .122
.02 .01
Commercial card
Overall treatment effect -.049 -.051
.38 .37
Treatment effect FS I .00 .00
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.5 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 .99
Treatment effect FS II -.098 -.116
.12 .09
Fiscal card
Overall treatment effect -.025 -.022
.42 .49
Treatment effect FS I .021 .022
.58 .57
Treatment effect FS II -.072 -.08
.05 .06
Social security card
Overall treatment effect .034 .037
.23 .22
Treatment effect FS I .051 .051
.15 .14
Treatment effect FS II .017 .017
.6 .64
Not registered
Overall treatment effect -.074 -.069
.19 .21
Treatment effect FS I -.054 -.049
.39 .42
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.5 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect FS II -.1 -.095
.14 .15
Registered as informal
Overall treatment effect .044 .039
.45 .49
Treatment effect FS I .007 .001
.91 .98
Treatment effect FS II .091 .089
.19 .2
Registered as formal
Overall treatment effect .03 .03
.49 .48
Treatment effect FS I .047 .048
.34 .32
Treatment effect FS II .009 .007
.86 .9
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
189
Despite the insignificant impact estimates, Figure 5.4 shows that the share of
informal registrations increased. From baseline to follow-up I the trend of infor-
mal registrations fares quite similar for the treatment and the control group. After
follow-up I, treatment group clients continue to register their activities as informal,
contrary to the control group where we observe a decline. Again, the assumption of
identical time trends suggests that the treatment group would have suffered from the
same decline in the absence of the intervention. Figure 5.5 depicts the situation for
formal registrations. In the treatment group the share of formally registered clients
is constant between baseline and follow-up I and shows even a slight decrease at
follow-up II.
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Figure 5.4: Registered as informal
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Figure 5.5: Registered as formal
Our results weakly point to the conclusion that a shift from unregistered activities
to informal sector activities occurred as a result of the intervention. The estimates
for the latter suggest a significant 10 percent increase. This is supported by a 10
percent increase in informal registrations, despite the estimates being insignificant
for informal registrations. However, no impact can be documented with regard to
formal registrations. The overall effect and the period specific effects are all small
and insignificant. Further, the wave specific estimates indicate that the availability of
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informal sector cards only increased in the second period. This might result from long
processing periods of the authorities. Two prerequisites for formalization, holdership
of a fiscal and a commercial card increase first, but then drop again at the last survey
round. Unsatisfactory experience with a higher degree of formality is one natural
explanation for this.
Tax Payments
A major factor in the formalization decision is the payment of taxes and other
fees to the authorities. From the client surveys we observe two sorts of payments that
formalized entrepreneurs have to make. A value-added-tax that is levied on services
and goods, Taxe valeur ajoute´ (TVA) and a tax levied on commercial and industrial
benefits, Be´ne´fice industriel et commercial (BIC). Our descriptive evidence for TVA
payments shows a temporary increase in the treatment group, followed by a decline.
This pattern is identical to that of commercial card possession and slightly similar to
the pattern we observe for formal registrations (compare with Figures 5.3 and 5.5).
This gives additional evidence for the explanation that formalization was incited,
but not sustained. The overall estimations are all insignificant, but the coefficient
signs confirm our explanation. The overall effect is close to zero, the impact in the
first period is positive, and the impact in the last period is negative.
For BIC payments we observe as well the triangle shaped pattern in the treatment
group. A modest increase of ten percent in the first period, is succeeded by a decline
of the same magnitude. Here, however, the estimated coefficients are positive and
highly significant. As we see, in Figure 5.7 it is the decline in BIC payments in the
control group that drives these estimation results.
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Figure 5.6: Paying TVA
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Figure 5.7: Paying BIC
Table 5.6: Impact on Payment of Taxes
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pays TVA
Overall treatment effect .006 .005
.88 .91
Treatment effect FS I .047 .042
.37 .41
Treatment effect FS II -.034 -.043
.49 .43
Pays BIC
Overall treatment effect .106 .117
.01 .00
Treatment effect FS I .123 .123
.01 .01
Treatment effect FS II .089 .11
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.6 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
.04 .02
Pays patent fees
Overall treatment effect -.079 -.082
.08 .05
Treatment effect FS I -.03 -.034
.54 .48
Treatment effect FS II -.128 -.144
.02 .00
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
Membership in Professional Organizations
We inquire whether the clients are members in professional organizations and ask
for three different memberships: MEBF, sector associations and other business asso-
ciation. We observe that in all three types of professional associations membership
decreases for the treatment group. Figure 5.8 and 5.9 display the graphs for MEBF
and other memberships. The impact estimates in Table 5.7 are in line with this.
We obtain negative and significant estimates of the overall impact and the period
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specific impact on membership in the MEBF. The impact on membership in other
professional associations is also negative. It remains a puzzle why these effects occur.
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Figure 5.8:
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Figure 5.9:
Member in other business as-
sociations
Figure 5.8 reveals that MEBF membership is constant in the control group. Since
no change happened here our difference-in-difference coefficients are equal to a before
and after comparison. A possible explanation of the stark decline in MEBF member-
ship after the baseline might be that some treatment group clients interpreted their
relation to the MEBF as a membership and at the awareness workshop understood
that they have a different status. Membership in other associations also decreased
in the treatment group but not as dramatically. Here, it is also the increase in the
control group that drives the significance of the negative impact estimate.
Access to Financial Products
In Figure 5.10, we see that the treatment group has a higher share of entrepreneurs
who have already a bank account at baseline. The difference amounts to 10 percent
and is statistically significant (Table 5.8). Also the share of clients holding separate
accounts for private and business purposes is not balanced but here it is the control
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Table 5.7: Impact on Membership in Professional Associations
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Maison de L’entreprise
Overall treatment effect -.057 -.06
.01 .01
Treatment effect FS I -.055 -.055
.03 .03
Treatment effect FS II -.06 -.066
.02 .02
Sector association
Overall treatment effect -.072 -.081
.06 .04
Treatment effect FS I -.042 -.042
.35 .35
Treatment effect FS II -.102 -.132
.02 .01
Not in any association
Overall treatment effect -.007 -.012
.76 .6
Treatment effect FS I .004 .004
.7 .71
Treatment effect FS II -.019 -.034
.68 .5
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
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group that has a higher share at baseline (Figure 5.11). Both outcomes increase in
the treatment group.
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Figure 5.10: Business bank account
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Figure 5.11: Separate bank accounts
Table 5.8: Summary Statistics on Access to Financial
Products by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -diff p-value
Business bank account only
Baseline 242 241 .52 .42 .1 .03
FS I 248 243 .68 .59 .09 .03
FS II 192 183 .77 .61 .15 .00
Private account only
Baseline 242 241 .02 .00 .02 .06
FS I 248 243 .04 .03 .01 .64
FS II 192 183 .03 .03 .00 .82
Same account
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.8 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Baseline 242 241 .34 .39 -.05 .24
FS I 248 243 .15 .28 -.13 .00
FS II 192 183 .08 .27 -.18 .00
Seperated accounts
Baseline 242 241 .11 .18 -.07 .04
FS I 248 243 .14 .1 .03 .24
FS II 192 183 .12 .09 .03 .4
Personal insurance
Baseline 248 240 .08 .07 .01 .56
FS I 248 243 .1 .19 -.09 .01
FS II 192 183 .17 .16 .00 .94
CNSS affiliation
Baseline 248 239 .11 .17 -.06 .06
FS I 248 243 .13 .16 -.04 .21
FS II 192 183 .16 .13 .03 .4
Theft
Baseline 248 243 .03 .01 .02 .1
FS I 248 243 .03 .02 .02 .26
FS II 248 243 .02 .00 .02 .06
Fire
Baseline 248 243 .03 .01 .02 .1
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.8 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS I 248 243 .04 .01 .03 .04
FS II 248 243 .03 .03 .00 .97
Other
Baseline 248 243 .02 .01 .01 .27
FS I 248 243 .02 .03 .00 .75
FS II 248 243 .00 .01 -.01 .08
Business not insured
Baseline 248 243 .06 .01 .05 .00
FS I 248 243 .00 .00 .00 .32
FS II 248 243 .26 .29 -.03 .4
The impact on ownership of bank accounts is positive but insignificant (5.9). Yet,
we obtain positive and significant estimates for the impact on whether the client holds
a separate bank account for private and business issues. Since formalization requires
a bank account it can be assumed that the treatment group opened new accounts in
the name of the business. The effect size is 10 percent which matches the increase
in registrations of informal status.
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Table 5.9: Impact on Bank Account Ownership
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Business account
Overall treatment effect .04 .042
.47 .46
Treatment effect FS I .008 .009
.9 .89
Treatment effect FS II .082 .084
.22 .21
Private account
Overall treatment effect -.019 -.019
.24 .24
Treatment effect FS I -.017 -.017
.38 .38
Treatment effect FS II -.022 -.022
.29 .29
Same account
Overall treatment effect -.117 -.117
.03 .03
Treatment effect FS I -.093 -.092
.11 .12
Treatment effect FS II -.148 -.149
.01 .01
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.9 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Seperated accounts
Overall treatment effect .096 .095
.02 .01
Treatment effect FS I .101 .101
.02 .02
Treatment effect FS II .088 .087
.06 .06
Personal insurance
Overall treatment effect -.059 -.06
.08 .08
Treatment effect FS I -.101 -.098
.01 .01
Treatment effect FS II -.006 -.01
.9 .83
Loan from commercial bank
Overall treatment effect -.008 -.01
.78 .74
Treatment effect FS I .00 .00
1 1
Treatment effect FS II -.017 -.024
.59 .5
Loan from other MFI
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.9 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall treatment effect .006 .002
.73 .93
Treatment effect FS I -.009 -.009
.7 .68
Treatment effect FS II .021 .015
.27 .46
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
Neither take-up of loans from commercial banks nor take-up of loans from other
microfinance institutions were affected significantly. Interestingly, as Table 5.10
shows, loans from other microfinance institutions where significantly more frequent
in the control group at baseline and decreased in the treatment group from 2 percent
to zero during the period of investigation.
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Table 5.10: Summary Statistics of Take-up of Other
Loans by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -diff p-value
Loan from commercial bank
Baseline 248 243 .07 .08 -.01 .81
FS I 248 243 .1 .1 0 .94
FS II 248 243 .04 .06 -.02 .38
Loan from MFI
Baseline 248 243 .02 .05 -.03 .04
FS I 248 243 0 .05 -.05 0
FS II 248 243 0 .02 -.02 .1
Figure 5.12 shows that the prevalence of personal insurance for health, life, etc.
increased in both groups. In the control group the increase is steeper until follow-up
I, but ultimately both group see an increase from roughly 10 percent to 17 percent
overall. The estimates of the impact on personal insurance emphasize the initially
stronger increase in the control group. The overall effect is negative and significant
despite the fact that both groups have similar shares at baseline and follow-up II.
This results from the strong and highly significant effect of 10 percent at follow-up
I. The impact at follow-up II is virtually zero.
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Figure 5.12: Any personal insurance
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Figure 5.13: CNSS Inscription
Social Security and Business Insurance
In the treatment group we observe an increase in inscriptions with the CNSS (Fig-
ure 5.13). While the estimate of the overall impact on CNSS inscriptions is positive
but insignificant, the estimate at follow-up II is significant at the 10 percent level and
amounts to 9 percent (Table 5.11). Given that we do not observe a similar impact
on formal registrations we conclude that it is entrepreneurs that were already formal
from the outset that got incited to enroll with CNSS as a result of the intervention.
As Table 5.11 shows, we estimate a small but significant negative impact on the
indicator ”Business is not insured”. In other words, the share of insured enterprises
increased. However, none of the impact estimates for business insurance (i.e. theft,
fire etc.) is significant. For ”Other insurances” we observe a slightly significant
negative effect in the last round, but the overall effect is insignificant.
Table 5.11: Impact on Take-up of Business Insurances
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Business insurance Theft
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.11 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall treatment effect -.002 .00
.89 1
Treatment effect FS I -.004 -.005
.83 .81
Treatment effect FS II .00 .006
1 .75
Business insurance Fire
Overall treatment effect -.006 -.005
.7 .77
Treatment effect FS I .009 .008
.65 .67
Treatment effect FS II -.021 -.022
.29 .35
Business insurance Other
Overall treatment effect -.017 -.018
.2 .2
Treatment effect FS I -.013 -.013
.49 .49
Treatment effect FS II -.021 -.025
.09 .08
Business not insured
Overall treatment effect -.063 -.059
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.11 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
.02 .00
Treatment effect FS I -.051 -.051
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS II -.075 -.069
.09 .02
Affiliated with CNSS
Overall treatment effect .051 .049
.2 .2
Treatment effect FS I .02 .019
.66 .66
Treatment effect FS II .091 .089
.06 .06
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
5.4.2 The Impact on Attitude
Perception of Formality
An array of questions inquires about the clients perception of and attitude to-
wards different issues related to formalization. From these we constructed dummy
variables. The innovation clients are more aware of issues related to formalization
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now. The impact estimates on attitude are presented in Table 5.12. The first item
assesses whether the clients think there is not enough information available to con-
sider formalization. The impact on this item is positive at the first follow up negative
at the second and overall close to zero. For the opinion that the process of formal-
ization takes to long we estimate positive effects that are almost significant at the
ten percent level.
The impact on the statement that the process of registration is too expensive
is negative and significant especially in the first period. It can be assumed that
this effect is driven by entrepreneurs that registered at follow-up I since the effect
coincides with the wave where we observe an impact on registrations as informal
enterprises. The effect on the statement that the process takes too long is positive
in the first period, but not significant.
Though throughout insignificant, the impact on the item stating that the formal-
ization process is too complicated is close to zero in the first period and negative in
the second.
Awareness about tax liability increased significantly. The period specific effects
are above 10 percent and highly significant especially in the second period. Regarding
the statement that tax payments are complicated we cannot document any conclusive
impact. Regarding problems with the inspectors we observe an effect close to zero
in the first wave and a slightly larger positive effect in the second wave. Both are
insignificant but the increase in effect size over time might suggest that the clients
made some negative experience.
The effects on the attitude item that registration reduces the flexibility for hiring
and firing of employees also suggest a change in attitude. At the first follow-up
this item shows a significant negative effect of 13 percent. At follow-up II the sign
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changed and treatment clients are now rather induced to agree with the statement.
Though the 10 percent effect is not significant.
For the last three statements in Table 5.12 we observe large effects, i.e. the
intervention caused clients to disagree with the statements that formalization obliges
entrepreneurs to pay social security contribution for employees and to adhere to
working and security standards. In a sense, these effects prove that the treatment
clients equate formalization with registration to the semi-formal status.
Table 5.12: Impact on Attitude Towards Formalization
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
There is not sufficient information available to consider
of the activity
Overall treatment effect -.002 .004
.97 .95
Treatment effect FS I .026 .033
.69 .62
Treatment effect FS II -.036 -.032
.62 .66
The process of registration takes too much time
Overall treatment effect .06 .059
.28 .28
Treatment effect FS I .102 .102
.1 .1
Treatment effect FS II .009 .008
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
.89 .9
Too expensive (the cost of registration is too high)
Overall treatment effect -.132 -.134
.02 .02
Treatment effect FS I -.159 -.164
.01 .01
Treatment effect FS II -.098 -.098
.16 .16
Once the activity is registrated one needes to fill out
and submit numerous documents which is to complicated
Overall treatment effect -.017 -.016
.78 .79
Treatment effect FS I .013 .013
.84 .84
Treatment effect FS II -.053 -.051
.45 .47
Once the activity is registrated one needs to pay taxes
Overall treatment effect .134 .136
.02 .02
Treatment effect FS I .117 .119
.09 .08
Treatment effect FS II .155 .156
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
.02 .02
It’s not a problem to pay taxes, but the system is so
complicated that it is better not to register
Overall treatment effect .008 .009
.89 .88
Treatment effect FS I .053 .052
.43 .43
Treatment effect FS II -.046 -.044
.51 .53
Inspectors come and harass the entrepreneurs
Overall treatment effect .027 .03
.65 .62
Treatment effect FS I .003 .004
.97 .95
Treatment effect FS II .056 .06
.43 .39
Once registered, there is less flexibility to employ and
discharge employees
Overall treatment effect -.03 -.029
.61 .62
Treatment effect FS I -.134 -.132
.04 .05
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect FS II .096 .095
.17 .18
Once registered, one needs to pay social security
contributions for the employees
Overall treatment effect -.059 -.057
.32 .33
Treatment effect FS I -.211 -.207
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS II .124 .123
.07 .07
Once registered, one needs to respect working standards
Overall treatment effect -.115 -.114
.05 .05
Treatment effect FS I -.228 -.226
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS II .022 .021
.75 .76
Once registered, one needs to respect security standards
Overall treatment effect -.114 -.112
.06 .06
Treatment effect FS I -.217 -.213
.00 .00
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect FS II .012 .011
.86 .87
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
Perception of Informality
We obtain large significant effects on the clients’ perception of informality. The
impact estimates indicate that the share of clients who believe informality is an obsta-
cle to training and other support services decreases significantly by 44 percent. The
share of clients who agree with the statement ”I cannot bid for advertised requests
for qualifications” decreases by roughly 10 percent. When asked about difficulties
in accessing financial services the impact estimates indicate a highly significant 20
percent decrease in the share of clients who suffer from such problems.
These results suggest, that the treatment clients assess the conditions of oper-
ating in the informal sector more positively after participating in the intervention.
When we link this to the low sustainability of registrations, one could assume that
the favorable perception of conditions in the informal sector are driven by negative
experience with higher degrees of formality.
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The intervention has not had a significant effect on the question whether client
spend a lot on health costs for employees, neither on the questions whether maternity
costs or bribe payments to the authorities need to be paid. On the question whether
inexplicable losses occur through employees we observe a strong positive impact, yet
we fail to understand why the intervention could have caused this.
Table 5.13: Impact on Perception of Informality
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
I cannot directly respond to advertised requests for qualifications
Overall treatment effect -.088 -.088
.11 .1
Treatment effect FS I -.107 -.107
.08 .08
Treatment effect FS II -.064 -.064
.32 .32
My access to financial services is more difficult
Overall treatment effect -.222 -.223
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS I -.192 -.193
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS II -.258 -.26
.00 .00
My access to training services and support for the
development of my activity is more difficult
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall treatment effect -.438 -.439
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS I -.465 -.467
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS II -.405 -.405
.00 .00
I have to pay a lot to cover my employees costs of sickness
when they are sick
Overall treatment effect .019 .016
.75 .78
Treatment effect FS I .069 .064
.29 .33
Treatment effect FS II -.044 -.043
.52 .54
I need to pay when my employees go on maternity leave.
Overall treatment effect .012 .009
.82 .87
Treatment effect FS I -.026 -.032
.66 .59
Treatment effect FS II .06 .06
.37 .37
I have to bribe the puble authorities representatives
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall treatment effect .069 .067
.21 .22
Treatment effect FS I .082 .079
.19 .2
Treatment effect FS II .053 .052
.43 .43
I suffer easily from inexplicable losses through my employees
Overall treatment effect .314 .313
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS I .249 .248
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS II .395 .395
.00 .00
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
5.4.3 The Impact on the Client’s Business
Turnover
Our main outcome indicator with respect to the clients’ business is monthly
turnover. We observe whether turnover of the clients’ business in the last month
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lies within three brackets: Below 500,000 FCFA, between 500,000 and 1,000,000
FCFA or above 1,000,000 FCFA. Again the descriptives indicate a bias in treatment
allocation towards larger firms. Table 5.15 shows that 56 percent among treatment
and 48 percent among control clients report turnover in the turnover bracket above
1 Mio FCFA. The difference is significant at the 10 percent level and potentially
threatens internal validity of the results. We observe that a share of roughly 30
percent of the clients has turnover in the lowest bracket and 20 percent in the middle
bracket. Figures 5.14 - 5.16 display how turnover in the two groups evolves over the
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Figure 5.16:
Turnover ≥
1, 000, 000
course of the project. Apart from the differences in levels, the pattern is identical
for treated and controls. Also the estimation results presented in Table 5.14 provide
no evidence for an impact of the intervention10.
Table 5.14: Impact on Turnover
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
≤500,000 FCFA
Overall treatment effect -.027 -.023
Continued on next page...10Important to mention is that the data on turnover is incomplete for follow-up II; roughly 20-25
percent of the sample have missing values.
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... table 5.14 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
.59 .64
Treatment effect FS I .007 .012
.9 .81
Treatment effect FS II -.071 -.069
.24 .25
500,000-1,000,000 FCFA
Overall treatment effect -.027 -.029
.56 .53
Treatment effect FS I -.051 -.055
.35 .31
Treatment effect FS II .003 .005
.95 .92
≥1,000,000 FCFA
Overall treatment effect .054 .052
.35 .36
Treatment effect FS I .044 .043
.5 .5
Treatment effect FS II .068 .064
.33 .36
Returns covers exp totally
Overall treatment effect .051 .046
.35 .4
Continued on next page...
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Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect FS I .048 .041
.43 .5
Treatment effect FS II .053 .052
.42 .43
Returns cover exp partially
Overall treatment effect -.047 -.042
.37 .42
Treatment effect FS I -.045 -.037
.45 .53
Treatment effect FS II -.051 -.049
.44 .44
Returns do not cov exp
Overall treatment effect -.01 -.01
.59 .6
Treatment effect FS I -.008 -.008
.7 .71
Treatment effect FS II -.012 -.012
.54 .56
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
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The questionnaire also offers information on whether the businesses’ gains are
sufficient to cover the expenses. Over 60 percent of the respondents in both groups
state that the returns cover expenses fully, for roughly 30 percent returns cover
expenses at least partially and only 3 percent report that their returns do not cover
the expenses. We cannot observe any significant impact on these indicators and also
the impact estimates are insignificant and small in size.
Table 5.15: Summary Statistics of Business Income by
Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -diff p-value
500, 000FCFA
Baseline 239 240 .26 .32 -.06 .14
FS I 247 243 .13 .19 -.05 .12
FS II 192 183 .17 .3 -.13 .00
500,000-1,000,000 FCFA
Baseline 239 240 .18 .2 -.02 .5
FS I 247 243 .22 .3 -.07 .06
FS II 192 183 .2 .22 -.02 .71
1, 000, 000FCFA
Baseline 239 240 .56 .48 .09 .06
FS I 247 243 .64 .52 .13 .00
FS II 192 183 .63 .49 .14 .00
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.15 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Returns cover expenses fully
Baseline 246 241 .63 .67 -.04 .38
FS I 248 243 .72 .72 .00 .97
FS II 192 183 .68 .67 .01 .83
Returns cover expenses partially
Baseline 246 241 .34 .29 .05 .27
FS I 248 243 .26 .25 .01 .86
FS II 192 183 .31 .31 .00 .98
Returns do not cover expenses
Baseline 246 241 .03 .03 .00 .76
FS I 248 243 .02 .03 -.01 .34
FS II 192 183 .01 .02 -.02 .16
We cannot observe any impact on the intervention on business turnover. This
is not surprising as, in the short run, one would assume that formalization and its
direct costs reduce the profitability but do not affect business turnover.
Management Practices
A major part of the intervention focused on management practices to prepare the
clients for formalization (see section 5.2). On this account, we observe considerable
improvement. Figure 5.17 shows how the share of clients who keep accounts develops
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over time. Control and treatment clients have nearly identical shares in this variable
at baseline. At follow-up I, a 35 percent increase occurs in the treatment group.
Since this is a self-reported measure we need to interpret it cautiously as treated
clients might be inclined to give desirable responses. Interestingly, in the treatment
the share decreases slightly afterwards and at follow-up II both groups have similar
levels again.
Table 5.16 informs on the kind of book-keeping that the clients apply. We see
that a specific cash-book where earnings and expenses are noted is the most frequent
practice in both groups. The share of clients that report to keep records in that
way is 10 percent higher in the control group at baseline but doubles from 30 to
60 percent in the treatment group. Also the practice of keeping a stock inventory
becomes more frequent over the time of investigation.
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Figure 5.17: Any book-keeping
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Figure 5.18:
System of management was
improved since last interview
Figure 5.18 presents the shares of clients who state that they have implemented
improvements in their management practices. Again, the large difference in favor for
the treatment group needs to be viewed with reservation as it is self-reported. Table
5.16 also lists whether these improvements have been beneficial to the clients’ busi-
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ness. Unsurprisingly, close to no entrepreneur reports to have implemented useless
changes.
Table 5.16: Summary Statistics on Book-keeping Prac-
tice by Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -diff p-value
Any book keeping?
Baseline 248 243 .65 .66 -.02 .69
FS I 248 243 1 .72 .28 .00
FS II 248 243 .95 .91 .04 .1
Specific book
Baseline 245 243 .32 .41 -.09 .04
FS I 248 243 .6 .45 .16 .00
FS II 248 243 .48 .43 .05 .25
Yearly balance
Baseline 245 243 .02 .01 .00 .71
FS I 248 243 .09 .13 -.03 .22
FS II 248 243 .09 .16 -.07 .02
Stock inventory
Baseline 245 243 .1 .07 .04 .15
FS I 248 243 .33 .34 -.01 .8
FS II 248 243 .00 .00 .00
Occasional book-keeper
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.16 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
Baseline 245 243 .15 .09 .05 .08
FS I 248 243 .12 .06 .06 .03
FS II 248 243 .08 .28 -.2 .00
Regular book-keeper
Baseline 245 243 .05 .08 -.03 .26
FS I 248 243 .07 .09 -.02 .38
FS II 248 243 .08 .07 .01 .54
Changed book-keeping
Baseline 248 243 .00 .00 .00
FS I 248 243 .6 .32 .29 .00
FS II 248 243 .44 .25 .19 .00
Benefitted from changes
Baseline
FS I 148 76 .97 .89 .08 .01
FS II 108 61 .99 .98 .01 .68
The difference-in-difference estimations confirm the descriptive picture. Book-
keeping as well as management improvements have both been affected positively.
We estimate an overall effect of 17 to 20 percent on whether book-keeping is ap-
plied or not. The effect is highly significant. The overall effect on improvements in
management is highly significant as well and ranges from 24 to 27 percent.
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Table 5.17: Impact on Book-keeping and Management
Practice
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Any book keeping?
Overall treatment effect .184 .201
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS I .298 .295
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS II .069 .078
.17 .14
Improved management
Overall treatment effect .233 .261
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS I .278 .279
.00 .00
Treatment effect FS II .188 .239
.00 .00
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
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Employment
In Figure 5.19 we see that the share of clients who have employees is high with 91
percent in the treatment and 85 percent in the control group. While the trends look
very similar, the estimates in Table 5.19 suggest a negative impact on employment.
The share of clients who have any employees decreases overall by 6 percent according
to the estimation with covariates. This effect is significant at the 10 percent level only.
The wave specific impact amounts to 8.6 percent and is significant at the 5 percent
level. On the intensive margin we do not obtain significant results but the estimate
for the impact on formal employees is positive while the the number of informal
employees was reduced. Given the additional cost of employment that a formalized
0
.
5
1
0 1 2
wave
Target group Control group
Source: RCPB−ILO data
Figure 5.19: Any Employees
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Figure 5.20: No. of Formal Employees
enterprise faces one would hypothesize a negative impact of the intervention on
employment for enterprises with few employees. Therefore, it comes as no surprise
that we see a decrease in the share of clients who have any employees. Also, the
opposing directions of the impact on formal and informal employees can be explained
as formalized switch from having informal employees to employing formally.
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Table 5.18: Summary Statistics on Employment by
Treatment Group
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -diff p-value
Any employees
Baseline 248 243 .91 .85 .06 .06
FS I 248 243 .98 .96 .02 .18
FS II 248 243 .74 .74 .01 .89
Number of formal employees
Baseline 51 67 2.78 4.97 -2.19 .1
FS I 64 62 2.95 4.13 -1.18 .07
FS II 42 31 3.31 3.71 -.4 .69
Number of informal employees
Baseline 207 181 4.92 4.81 .11 .86
FS I 225 208 4.36 4.73 -.37 .49
FS II 170 172 4.44 4.1 .34 .5
Number of employees with social security
Baseline 38 44 2.05 2.34 -.29 .41
FS I 50 39 2.52 3.87 -1.35 .06
FS II
Any new inscriptions with social security
Baseline
FS I 205 241 .09 .09 .00 .96
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.18 continued
Sample Size Mean Mean t-test
Variable Names Treated Control Treated Control -difference p-value
FS II 192 182 .02 .02 .00 .94
Number of social security inscriptions
Baseline
FS I 20 22 1.65 3.09 -1.44 .06
FS II 4 4 3.25 1.5 1.75 .26
Table 5.19: Impact on Employment in Clients’ Business
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Any employees
Overall treatment effect -.053 -.059
.15 .06
Treatment effect FS I -.038 -.037
.26 .26
Treatment effect FS II -.069 -.086
.17 .01
Number of formal employees
Overall treatment effect 1.395 1.247
.3 .33
Treatment effect FS I 1.07 .861
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.19 continued
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
.44 .49
Treatment effect FS II 1.953 1.932
.23 .26
Number of informal employees
Overall treatment effect -.47 -.525
.51 .45
Treatment effect FS I -.685 -.721
.39 .36
Treatment effect FS II -.195 -.277
.8 .72
Note: This table reports regression coefficients and p-values.
The inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The regressions use all observations from all waves (pooled sample).
In the regressions reported in (2) and (4) we include individual controls.
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper we assess the efforts of a large microfinance organization in Burkina
Faso to foster changes in the registration status of its clients’ enterprises. Our analysis
shows that clients venture into formality in the short run, but do not take the final
step to become formal. These results persist even after eradication of time-constant
differences in the treatment and control group that were caused by targeted program
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placement. This indicates that formalization is not perceived a valid option by the
entrepreneurs. This fuels the argument that support for microenterprises, e.g. better
access to credit and social protection, should not be conditional on their registration
status (Sparks and Barnett, 2010).
Our analysis fails to provide insight to the reasons why higher rates of formaliza-
tion were not achieved. It can be assumed that from the entrepreneurs’ perspective
the benefits of formalization did not outweigh the costs. Gelb et al. (2009) study the
informal sector in East and South Africa and conclude that registrations of informal
firms remain rare in a weak business environment characterized by low quality of
infrastructure and lack of financial services. Consequently, they propose that for-
malization is only a viable option if its costs are reduced. In Burkina, such efforts
are being implemented, as the rate of taxes that semi-formalized enterprises pay is
lower than in the formal sector. Still it seems that the costs of formalization are too
high, or that other parameters oppose permanent formalization.
Ge¨rxhani (2004) reviews the literature on the informal sector and concludes that
the belief predominates that the disadvantages of a large informal sector outweigh the
advantages. With this in mind, it should be further determined what it is that kept
RCPBs clients from formalizing. Identifying these issues can enable policymakers
with an interest in supporting micro- and small-scale entrepreneurial activities to
create a more favorable business environment.
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